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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
failed to recognize their objectives in time to attack or else ran into
such stiff opposition that they could not bomb. T w o planes were shot
down by flak and one was badly damaged. The British lost one plane,
evidently as a result of flak damage plus the attentions of the only
enemy fighter to make effective interception that day. But the Ameri-
can losses did not stem entirely from the inexperience of freshmen
crews, although one of the pilots shot down was reported to have
taken insufficient evasive action in the flak area. T h e fact was that for
some reason the mission ran into very heavy opposition from antiair-
craft batteries, especially at the two northern airdromes of De Kooy
and Haamstede. It even seemed to the surviving crews that the enemy
gunners must have been warned in advance by ships in the Channel
which had sighted the Bostons on their trip toward the Dutch coast.
The RAF leader of the element attacking De Kooy reported the
worst flak in his experience, and over-all losses in this one mission were
declared to have been equal to the total losses of No. 2 2 6 Squadron
in similar operations for the preceding five and one-half months.ll
During the mission, however, one incident occurred which proved
heartening to the American force and which did much to offset the
otherwise discouraging results. Capt. Charles C. Kegelman, flying
with the element detailed to bomb De Kooy airdrome, had his right
propeller shot away by flak while in the vicinity of the target. The
ground fire also damaged his right wing and started a fire in his right
engine. Kegelman's plane lost altitude and actually struck the ground,
but he was able to keep it in the air after it bounced back up. Then,
as he was preparing to leave the scene as fast as his one good engine
would take him, he saw the gunners of a flak tower swinging their
guns on him. Turning slightly, he flew directly a t the tower and
opened fire with the nose guns at close range. Fire from the tower
ceased. H e then proceeded to fly home at water level. For this ex-
ploit, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.'
The mission of 4 July had not been an ideal operation with which
to inaugurate the American air offensive from the United Kingdom.
Not only was it a small raid and one flown in borrowed planes, but
it was tactically of little significance since the future of the bomber
campaign depended on the development of high-altitude heavy bom-
bardment techniques rather than those of low-level attack by fast,
light planes. Nevertheless, the mission marked a beginning of a sort
and did much to stimulate morale among the American flyers. At
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