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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
failed to recognize their objectives in time to attack or else ran into
such stiff opposition that they could not bomb. T w o planes were shot
down by flak and one was badly damaged. The British lost one plane,
evidently as a result of flak damage plus the attentions of the only
enemy fighter to make effective interception that day. But the Ameri-
can losses did not stem entirely from the inexperience of freshmen
crews, although one of the pilots shot down was reported to have
taken insufficient evasive action in the flak area. T h e fact was that for
some reason the mission ran into very heavy opposition from antiair-
craft batteries, especially at the two northern airdromes of De Kooy
and Haamstede. It even seemed to the surviving crews that the enemy
gunners must have been warned in advance by ships in the Channel
which had sighted the Bostons on their trip toward the Dutch coast.
The RAF leader of the element attacking De Kooy reported the
worst flak in his experience, and over-all losses in this one mission were
declared to have been equal to the total losses of No. 2 2 6 Squadron
in similar operations for the preceding five and one-half months.ll
During the mission, however, one incident occurred which proved
heartening to the American force and which did much to offset the
otherwise discouraging results. Capt. Charles C. Kegelman, flying
with the element detailed to bomb De Kooy airdrome, had his right
propeller shot away by flak while in the vicinity of the target. The
ground fire also damaged his right wing and started a fire in his right
engine. Kegelman's plane lost altitude and actually struck the ground,
but he was able to keep it in the air after it bounced back up. Then,
as he was preparing to leave the scene as fast as his one good engine
would take him, he saw the gunners of a flak tower swinging their
guns on him. Turning slightly, he flew directly a t the tower and
opened fire with the nose guns at close range. Fire from the tower
ceased. H e then proceeded to fly home at water level. For this ex-
ploit, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.'
The mission of 4 July had not been an ideal operation with which
to inaugurate the American air offensive from the United Kingdom.
Not only was it a small raid and one flown in borrowed planes, but
it was tactically of little significance since the future of the bomber
campaign depended on the development of high-altitude heavy bom-
bardment techniques rather than those of low-level attack by fast,
light planes. Nevertheless, the mission marked a beginning of a sort
and did much to stimulate morale among the American flyers. At
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