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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
R O U E N - S O T T E V I L L E N O . I
in a day, and results of practice against aerial targets continued to be
di~appointing.~
Similar difficulties attended the introduction of American fighter
units into the United Kingdom. The 3 1st Fighter Group, commanded
by Maj. J.R. Hawkins, began training at Atcham on 2 6 June. Inspec-
tion by British and American authorities revealed at that time de-
ficiencies in gunnery, formation flying, navigation, combat tactics,
and, in some cases, instrument flying. The pilots had also to be trained
in British operating procedures, in flying a t the maximum cruising
speeds necessary for operations over enemy territory, and in the diffi-
cult task of assembling and navigating large formations a t extremely
low altitudes-a necessary procedure in avoiding detection by enemy
radar. In addition to these training problems, the new unit was handi-
capped by a radical change of equipment. Initially trained on P-39’s,
it was required to convert to Spitfires, a process which was not com-
pleted without a number of accidents. In order to facilitate conversion
to the British equipment, six of the group’s ranking pilots were de-
tached for operational experience with a Canadian squadron.6
Despite unfavorable weather and congested facilities, the 3 1st
Group received intensive training. RAF Bomber Command lent its
assistance and, as training progressed, AAF element, flight, and squad-
ron commanders were attached temporarily to British units, with
which they flew a few fighter sweeps as wingmen. By mid-August
the group was fully operational and had been transferred to the south
of England in preparation for initial operations under RAF control.
Each of the three squadrons was attached for this purpose to separate
wings of RAF No. I I Group until they had gained enough combat
experience to be able to fly as a group. Although other American
fighter units were beginning to arrive in the theater, the 3 1st remained
at this time the only one on fully operational status. There were, of
course, three RAF squadrons-the famous Eagle squadrons-composed
of American volunteer pilots. These flyers were transferred to the
AAF in September 1942, forming the 4th Fighter Group7
Intensive as the training of the new fighter units had been, it was
clear by the middle of August that they were as yet neither numerous
enough nor sufficiently seasoned to provide the cover necessary for
the first bomber missions. Fighter escort, on a relatively large scale,
was considered essential to the success of the day bomber campaign,
and it was planned to use extensive cover on the initial missions and
65 7

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