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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 370 …Reichers took a route by way of Cairo across central Africa, the South Atlantic, and up…
  • p. 371 …I 0,000 miles separated Miami from Cairo.23An airplane leaving southern Florida traveled 4,000…
  • p. 372 …of Africa and across central Africa to Cairo. Ferrying operations over the South Atlantic route had…
  • p. 375 …Takoradi following the completion of deliveries to Cairo, and for hauling critical items of supply east…
  • p. 378 …7 December the service was extended to Cairo and beyond.54 Before operations could begin, Pan…
  • p. 379 …Maxwell had been established at Cairo on I 3 September 1941, with responsibilities similar to those…
  • p. 380 …to the opening of a service to Cairo over the South Atlantic route. Two survey flights…
  • p. 381 …R Y I N G Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important military…
  • p. 382 …of the bombers departed Bolling Field for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across…
  • p. 385 …Lend-lease planes for Russia were flown through Cairo to Basra or to Tehran, where they…
  • p. 387 …for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more exposed to attack, Takoradi and…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 390 …24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The first step was to establish a ferrying…
  • p. 391 …parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from…
  • p. 395 …assembled and then ferried across Africa to Cairo. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the…
  • p. 407 …Harbor, first to Britain and later to Cairo, had been little more than courier services and…
  • p. 411 …from their normal operations between Washington and Cairo and sent to the Far East. A plan…
  • p. 412 …Kester-the pilot who had inaugurated the Washington- Cairo transport service in November-was lost off…
  • p. 413 …In February, Transcontinental & Western Air began operating a shuttle service from Washington to Cairo, using two…
  • p. 629 …5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the…
  • p. 630 …one group of heavies set up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial…
  • p. 778 …CM-IN, MA Cairo to M E I D 65. CM-IN, London (Brett) to Trip…
  • p. 779 …1942; CM- IN, Cairo (Fellen) to T A G (Adler for Arnold), 8754 Amseg, 3 Feb…
  • p. 786 …1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb. IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T…
  • p. 830 …BOLERO BR CAA C/AAF C/AC CAIRO C/AS C A T F CCRC CCS…
  • p. 844 …5 Cagayan (Mindanao), 219 Cagayan Valley, 208 Cairo, 3 1 ~ 2 1 , 325-26, 328-29…
C H A P T E R 18
* * * * * * * * * * *
ROUEN-SOTTE VILLE
NO. 2 , 27 AUGUST 2942
HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere
charged with curiosity, impatience, and skepticism. Ameri-
T can air planners held the tactical feasibility of daylight
strategic bombardment as a fundamental hypothesis, and on it they
had based their entire plan for an air offensive against Germany; but
it had yet to be demonstrated under combat conditions in the Euro-
pean theater. The hypothesis had yet to be proved not only to sym-
pathetic observers in the AAF but to those, especially in Great Britain,
who had no reason to believe that precision bombing by daylight
could add significantly to the bombardment program, and who, on
the basis of certain early and unfortunate experiments with the Fly-
ing Fortress, were inclined to doubt the virtues of the American plan
and the capacity of the American equipment. Not unnaturally, then,
the AAF was impatient to put its ideas and its planes to the test, and
British observers awaited that same moment, their interest tinged with
politely expressed skepticism.
Preparation for Combat
T w o things in particular contributed to the impatience of the
Eighth Air Force commanders. In the first place, their units were
slow in arriving. As a result of delays probably inevitable a t that
stage of mobilization in the United States, it was not until 27 July
that a single heavy bombardment group became available complete
with air and ground echelons.' In the second place, the new units were
found to need more training in the theater than had originally been
planned. Some such training had been considered necessary in order
to acquaint pilots and crews with British control methods, the topog-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.