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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

C H A P T E R 18
* * * * * * * * * * *
ROUEN-SOTTE VILLE
NO. 2 , 27 AUGUST 2942
HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere
charged with curiosity, impatience, and skepticism. Ameri-
T can air planners held the tactical feasibility of daylight
strategic bombardment as a fundamental hypothesis, and on it they
had based their entire plan for an air offensive against Germany; but
it had yet to be demonstrated under combat conditions in the Euro-
pean theater. The hypothesis had yet to be proved not only to sym-
pathetic observers in the AAF but to those, especially in Great Britain,
who had no reason to believe that precision bombing by daylight
could add significantly to the bombardment program, and who, on
the basis of certain early and unfortunate experiments with the Fly-
ing Fortress, were inclined to doubt the virtues of the American plan
and the capacity of the American equipment. Not unnaturally, then,
the AAF was impatient to put its ideas and its planes to the test, and
British observers awaited that same moment, their interest tinged with
politely expressed skepticism.
Preparation for Combat
T w o things in particular contributed to the impatience of the
Eighth Air Force commanders. In the first place, their units were
slow in arriving. As a result of delays probably inevitable a t that
stage of mobilization in the United States, it was not until 27 July
that a single heavy bombardment group became available complete
with air and ground echelons.' In the second place, the new units were
found to need more training in the theater than had originally been
planned. Some such training had been considered necessary in order
to acquaint pilots and crews with British control methods, the topog-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.