“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
western Europe in the spring of 1943, a plan for the build-up and
accommodation of American forces in the United Kingdom had been
initiated in late April under the code name of BOLER0.lDoCom-
bined committees of British and American members, their province
falling entirely in the field of logistics, were set up in Washington
and London to expedite arrangements for the build-up. Composed of
key staff officers of the several planning agencies concerned, these
committees served to co-ordinate the effort on the highest level.
With April 1943 set tentatively as the target date for ROUNDUP,
the Operations Division of the War Department and AAF Head-
quarters in May 1942 drafted plans to place by that time I,OOO,OOO
American troops in the United Kingdom. The troop basis was broken
down to provide 525,000 ground troops, 240,000 air force troops,
and 235,000 for Services of Supply.1D1Within the limit thus set, the
AAF by I 3 May had developed a “Rough Estimate-Tentative” which
called for the placing in the United Kingdom prior to I April 1943
of twenty-one heavy bombardment groups, eight medium bombard-
ment groups, nine light bombardment groups, seventeen pursuit
groups, six observation groups, and eight transport groups-the grand
total being sixty-nine groups plus supporting service units.lgz As the
figures themselves indicate, the force would represent a balance be-
tween the requirements of a previously planned program of strategic
bombardment and of the tactical operations to be expected in the
actual invasion of Europe.
A further development and refinement of these studies enabled
General Arnold during his conferences with Air Chief Marshal Portal
in late May to present a “Programme of Arrival of U.S. Army Air
Forces in the United Kingdom” which provided for a flow into the
theater by March 1943 of sixty-six combat groups, exclusive of ob-
servation squadrons, and of 3,649 airplanes. The breakdown had been
adjusted as follows: for bombardment, nineteen heavy, twelve me-
dium, and twelve light groups; for pursuit, fifteen groups; and for
transport, eight. The proposed build-up would advance from fifteen
groups in July to thirty-five in November and to sixty-six in March.
General Arnold anticipated that by I April 1943 the Eighth would
have in combat units 700 heavy bombers, 800 medium bombers, 342
light bombers, and 960 fighters.Ig3 At the time of General Arnold’s
departure from London for home on 2 June 1942, the actual strength
6 5 2