Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
June, General Spaatz on 2 1 August was assigned additional responsi-
bilities as theater Air 0 f f i ~ e r . I ~ ~Over and above the special assur-
ance thus provided of the active participation of air officers in theater
planning at its highest level, the step marked the beginning of a close
personal relationship between Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz which
contributed greatly to the successful development and employment of
American air power in the war against Germany. The Eighth Air
Force had been assigned to the theater's command, and already a
directive of z I July to General Spaatz had gone far toward clarifying
the main outlines of the relationship thus e~tablished."~That relation-
ship naturally reflected something of the new status of semiautonomy
attained by the AAF within the Army, as well as some of the diffi-
culties inherent in a status which required sharper definition.
In the attempt to work out a practical definition suited to the re-
quirements of the European theater, primary importance attached to
questions of supply. Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee having been selected
for command of the theater Services of Supply (SOS), which was
on an organizational level with the Eighth Air Force, conferences
between him and key figures of the VIII Air Force Service Command
prior to their departure from the United States went far toward
fixing the basic policies that would be followed after the opening of
General Lee's headquarters in England on 2 4 May.175The SOS would
be responsible for all problems of construction, for debarkation ac-
tivities, and for the supply of items common to both ground and
air forces. In addition the theater retained the final authority for
determining priorities for shipping from the United States. Under
the over-all logistical control of the SOS, however, the VIII Air Force
Service Command held primary responsibility for all supply and main-
tenance peculiar to the air f o r ~ e . " ~The decision in effect conceded to
the AAF in Britain a substantial degree of logistical autonomy; yet in
a matter as vital as airdrome construction VIII Air Force Service
Command could act only through SOS."' A certain amount of fric-
tion was unavoidable, and though individual differences usually could
be settled by agreement, the fundamental difficulty continued. A
natural goal of AAF personnel became the establishment of a service
command independent of SOS and on the same echelon of com-
mand."*
In July the details of a master plan for the occupation and develop-
ment of an VIII Bomber Command sector were worked out with
649

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.