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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
June, General Spaatz on 2 1 August was assigned additional responsi-
bilities as theater Air 0 f f i ~ e r . I ~ ~Over and above the special assur-
ance thus provided of the active participation of air officers in theater
planning at its highest level, the step marked the beginning of a close
personal relationship between Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz which
contributed greatly to the successful development and employment of
American air power in the war against Germany. The Eighth Air
Force had been assigned to the theater's command, and already a
directive of z I July to General Spaatz had gone far toward clarifying
the main outlines of the relationship thus e~tablished."~That relation-
ship naturally reflected something of the new status of semiautonomy
attained by the AAF within the Army, as well as some of the diffi-
culties inherent in a status which required sharper definition.
In the attempt to work out a practical definition suited to the re-
quirements of the European theater, primary importance attached to
questions of supply. Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee having been selected
for command of the theater Services of Supply (SOS), which was
on an organizational level with the Eighth Air Force, conferences
between him and key figures of the VIII Air Force Service Command
prior to their departure from the United States went far toward
fixing the basic policies that would be followed after the opening of
General Lee's headquarters in England on 2 4 May.175The SOS would
be responsible for all problems of construction, for debarkation ac-
tivities, and for the supply of items common to both ground and
air forces. In addition the theater retained the final authority for
determining priorities for shipping from the United States. Under
the over-all logistical control of the SOS, however, the VIII Air Force
Service Command held primary responsibility for all supply and main-
tenance peculiar to the air f o r ~ e . " ~The decision in effect conceded to
the AAF in Britain a substantial degree of logistical autonomy; yet in
a matter as vital as airdrome construction VIII Air Force Service
Command could act only through SOS."' A certain amount of fric-
tion was unavoidable, and though individual differences usually could
be settled by agreement, the fundamental difficulty continued. A
natural goal of AAF personnel became the establishment of a service
command independent of SOS and on the same echelon of com-
mand."*
In July the details of a master plan for the occupation and develop-
ment of an VIII Bomber Command sector were worked out with
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.