“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
June, General Spaatz on 2 1 August was assigned additional responsi-
bilities as theater Air 0 f f i ~ e r . I ~ ~Over and above the special assur-
ance thus provided of the active participation of air officers in theater
planning at its highest level, the step marked the beginning of a close
personal relationship between Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz which
contributed greatly to the successful development and employment of
American air power in the war against Germany. The Eighth Air
Force had been assigned to the theater's command, and already a
directive of z I July to General Spaatz had gone far toward clarifying
the main outlines of the relationship thus e~tablished."~That relation-
ship naturally reflected something of the new status of semiautonomy
attained by the AAF within the Army, as well as some of the diffi-
culties inherent in a status which required sharper definition.
In the attempt to work out a practical definition suited to the re-
quirements of the European theater, primary importance attached to
questions of supply. Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee having been selected
for command of the theater Services of Supply (SOS), which was
on an organizational level with the Eighth Air Force, conferences
between him and key figures of the VIII Air Force Service Command
prior to their departure from the United States went far toward
fixing the basic policies that would be followed after the opening of
General Lee's headquarters in England on 2 4 May.175The SOS would
be responsible for all problems of construction, for debarkation ac-
tivities, and for the supply of items common to both ground and
air forces. In addition the theater retained the final authority for
determining priorities for shipping from the United States. Under
the over-all logistical control of the SOS, however, the VIII Air Force
Service Command held primary responsibility for all supply and main-
tenance peculiar to the air f o r ~ e . " ~The decision in effect conceded to
the AAF in Britain a substantial degree of logistical autonomy; yet in
a matter as vital as airdrome construction VIII Air Force Service
Command could act only through SOS."' A certain amount of fric-
tion was unavoidable, and though individual differences usually could
be settled by agreement, the fundamental difficulty continued. A
natural goal of AAF personnel became the establishment of a service
command independent of SOS and on the same echelon of com-
mand."*
In July the details of a master plan for the occupation and develop-
ment of an VIII Bomber Command sector were worked out with
649