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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor- rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
  • p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of World W a r I…
  • p. 47 …being made up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French…
  • p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its…
  • p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force, usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
  • p. 114 …I when a British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist…
  • p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain…
  • p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
  • p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain The German bombing of Britain in World…
  • p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the…
  • p. 131 …it was hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off any German…
  • p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air over rhe…
  • p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug- gest that the…
  • p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were…
  • p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under- standing ally. It is…
  • p. 171 …British requirements amounted to 49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
  • p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
  • p. 290 …to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was…
  • p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF, magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt, rapidly went beyond the…
  • p. 341 …enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those…
  • p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
  • p. 369 …The majority of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com- mand…
  • p. 391 …of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
  • p. 398 …an initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of Germany. Questions remained regarding…
  • p. 404 …air force personnel were concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on the…
  • p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs, and cadres of American pilots and ground…
  • p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
  • p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
  • p. 557 …Even when the enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and A…
  • p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal run should be between the RAF base a…
  • p. 566 …Unable to challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF and A V…
  • p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese were using…
  • p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
  • p. 610 …Fleet Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained for sea search and…
  • p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
  • p. 615 …it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to…
  • p. 619 …On the tactical side, valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew which flew two…
  • p. 626 …bomber crews flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy airfields." During the seven…
  • p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut was contemplated; and…
  • p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
  • p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
  • p. 634 …T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as…
  • p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
  • p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
  • p. 637 …I ) allocate to Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according to an…
  • p. 647 …TRIGGER, a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
  • p. 648 …important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
  • p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be made for two chains of command-that of the…
  • p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ; and while it provided…
  • p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force…
  • p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor…
  • p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5 It is significant that this…
  • p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations in…
  • p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF bomber offensive and criticized…
  • p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined attack on Germany, the RAF…
  • p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for strategic bombardment, an attitude…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
Isle as soon as the other movement had cleared the field there. The
way was clear by 2 2 July, when twenty-eight P-38’s of the 14th
Group escorted by six B-17’s flew from Presque Isle to Goose Bay.
The other planes followed in a continuing movement that was dis-
tinguished chiefly by the pioneering effort of the 92d Group in
accomplishing between 1 5 and 2 7 August the nonstop flight of all
four of its squadrons from Gander in Newfoundland to Prestwick
without the loss of a plane.155
By the end of August, 386 aircraft-164 P-38’s, I 19 B-17’s, and 103
C-47’s-had crossed to England by the North Atlantic ferry route.
Additional groups and replacement aircraft for the Eighth and
Twelfth Air Forces would follow during the remainder of the year;
all told, 920 planes by I January 1943 had attempted the crossing ar?d
882 reached their destinations, of which approximately 700 belonged
to the Eighth. The anticipated accident ratio of 10 per cent did not
materialize-it actually amounted to 5.2 per cent. Of the 38 planes
failing to reach Prestwick, 29 were classified as “wrecked” and 9 as
“lost.” The AAF had been particularly anxious about the P-38’s, but
out of 186 dispatched during 1942 only 7 failed to reach their destina-
tion; in addition to the 6 wrecked in July, I was subsequently l 0 ~ t . l ~ ’
And before passing on, it should be noted that nearly all of the 700
planes delivered to the Eighth were flown by their own combat crews,
not by veteran and highly trained ferry or transport pilots.
As the movements developed, the principal concern of AAF leaders
in England was over the slowness of the initial movement and the
prospect that winter would cut off this line of reinforcement. They
hoped that improvement of communications and weather facilities
would permit not only bombers but fighters to make the flight, but
Headquarters, AAF felt the risks were too great. After December, the
North Atlantic route was closed to virtually all planes until spring.15‘
Establishment in United Kingdom
The period extending from the opening of General Spaatz’ head-
quarters in the United Kingdom on 18 June 15’ to the first heavy
bomber mission on 1 7 August saw the completion of the initial stage
in the development of the Eighth Air Force. Its headquarters-in
code WIDEWING-was located in the suburbs southwest of London
a t Bushy Park, Teddington. During the latter part of June and in
July, the newly established headquarters gathered into its hands the
645

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.