“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
devices. Leaders of the AAF were fortunate in the opportunity to
base their major effort in one of the highly industrialized countries
of the world, for the British were in a position to render a variety of
substantial services that would hasten greatly the Eighth's entry into
operations. Fortunately, too, there had been opportunities before
Pearl Harbor to consider with British leaders some of the particular
problems to be faced, and to agree tentatively on an approach to their
solution.
The RAF had operated with American-built aircraft long before
America's entrance into the war. American-built Catalinas had played
a prominent part in the North Atlantic search for the battleship Bis-
marck in May 1941;P-40's had fought against the Italians and Ger-
mans in Africa; and RAF Turbinlite night fighter squadrons and some
bomber squadrons had been equipped with the American A-20 dur-
ing 1941. Subsequent to the adoption of lend-lease in March of 1941,
the RAF pool of American-built aircraft had been increased to such
proportions that maintenance of the aircraft became a problem of
special concern to the British. T o render assistance in this matter,
and a t the same time to extract valuable information from the experi-
ence of the RAF in the use of our equipment, a small number of
American maintenance personnel was present in the United Kingdom
as early as June 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister
Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell
Harriman requested that this assistance be greatly e~panded.'~
In accordance with War Department instructions, the AAF in
August sent Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to
England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was instructed to
study British needs and to recommend such action as the Americans
might take under a general plan to provide civilian personnel who
could be spared without serious interference with American produc-
tion."' The scope of his inquiries was broadened in September to
include British needs in the Middle East;'"' and was still further
extended by a request from SPOBS that in any consideration of
facilities to be provided he bear in mind the needs of an American
force much larger than that specified in RAINBOW No. 5 . Through
Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney it was indicated that SPOBS already
had under consideration the establishment of a depot for the repair
of American-built aircraft a t Langford Lodge in Northern Ireland.lo2
At the end of October, General Brett submitted his report to
634