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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
By no means the least significant of the influences growing out of
arrangements with the British for the occupation of airdromes was
the effect on the organization of the Eighth Air Force. In taking over
British fields, the unit of transfer was normally an RAF group area,
which, in the case of No. 8 Group, was to have twenty-one fields,
divided into seven “clutches” of three fields each. One of the three
fields in each clutch acted as a wing or station headquarters and it
alone had direct communication with group headquarters, which, in
turn, was the only station in the group area having direct communi-
cation with RAF Bomber Command headquarters. Since without
extensive modification of the communications network it would be
impossible for VIII Bomber Command headquarters to exercise direct
control of the operations of all bombardment groups, General Eaker
planned the establishment, originally on a provisional basis, of combat
wings, each of which was to exercise operational control of three
groups. Although much larger in numbers of aircraft and personnel,
the combat wing would parallel the RAF wing in the communica-
tions network, and would be, a t the same time, a desirable operational
echelon of the VIII Bomber Command. T h e combat wings were to
be grouped in threes or fours under bombardment wings which, in
turn, were directly responsible to VIII Bomber Command head-
quarters. T h e bombardment wings, which developed into the great
air divisions of 1943-45, resembled the RAF groups in that their head-
quarters were the only installations having direct communications
with VIII Bomber Command headquarters. This pattern of organiza-
tion, dictated by both communications and operational considerations,
would be in existence in the Eighth Air Force by the spring of 1943.’’
No part of the problem of establishing an American air force in
Britain was more fundamental, or entailed more difficulties, than that
of providing adequate supply and maintenance. A modern air force
operating on the scale planned for the Eighth consumes almost un-
believable quantities of fuel and lubricants; requires in addition to the
normal supplies of any military organization vast stores of spare parts
and tools; and depends for its continuing operation upon facilities for
repair and maintenance ranging all the way from the relatively simple
equipment used by the ground crew to elaborate and extensive base
depots. These speak more forcefully than does anything else, unless
it be the aircraft factory itself, of the simple fact that the airplane is
a product of the machine age and remains dependent on its technical
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.