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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
By no means the least significant of the influences growing out of
arrangements with the British for the occupation of airdromes was
the effect on the organization of the Eighth Air Force. In taking over
British fields, the unit of transfer was normally an RAF group area,
which, in the case of No. 8 Group, was to have twenty-one fields,
divided into seven “clutches” of three fields each. One of the three
fields in each clutch acted as a wing or station headquarters and it
alone had direct communication with group headquarters, which, in
turn, was the only station in the group area having direct communi-
cation with RAF Bomber Command headquarters. Since without
extensive modification of the communications network it would be
impossible for VIII Bomber Command headquarters to exercise direct
control of the operations of all bombardment groups, General Eaker
planned the establishment, originally on a provisional basis, of combat
wings, each of which was to exercise operational control of three
groups. Although much larger in numbers of aircraft and personnel,
the combat wing would parallel the RAF wing in the communica-
tions network, and would be, a t the same time, a desirable operational
echelon of the VIII Bomber Command. T h e combat wings were to
be grouped in threes or fours under bombardment wings which, in
turn, were directly responsible to VIII Bomber Command head-
quarters. T h e bombardment wings, which developed into the great
air divisions of 1943-45, resembled the RAF groups in that their head-
quarters were the only installations having direct communications
with VIII Bomber Command headquarters. This pattern of organiza-
tion, dictated by both communications and operational considerations,
would be in existence in the Eighth Air Force by the spring of 1943.’’
No part of the problem of establishing an American air force in
Britain was more fundamental, or entailed more difficulties, than that
of providing adequate supply and maintenance. A modern air force
operating on the scale planned for the Eighth consumes almost un-
believable quantities of fuel and lubricants; requires in addition to the
normal supplies of any military organization vast stores of spare parts
and tools; and depends for its continuing operation upon facilities for
repair and maintenance ranging all the way from the relatively simple
equipment used by the ground crew to elaborate and extensive base
depots. These speak more forcefully than does anything else, unless
it be the aircraft factory itself, of the simple fact that the airplane is
a product of the machine age and remains dependent on its technical
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.