Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the latter policy had in effect already been adopted, as General Eaker
well understood.
It had been decided in December 1941that American bomber units,
a t least initially, would be based in the general area of Huntingdon
and East Anglia, a section of England lying above London and known
to Americans chiefly as a principal source of the Puritan emigration
to New England in the seventeenth century. Because of the time
required for the construction of airdromes and their fundamental
importance to any plan for combined operations, the British and
American staffs had given the question consideration at an early date.
According to information used by the American Air Staff in August
I 94 I , when it was engaged in the drafting of AWPD/ I , there would
be available for American use after the RAF had reached maximum
strength 105 airdromes for bombers and 2 5 for pursuit planes.s6 Told
of the scale of operations contemplated by the Americans, the RAF
notified the AAF in the following December that airdrome accom-
modations for 2 , 3 0 0 American heavy bombers could be made ready
by June 1943." American officers had undertaken in October and
November a survey of airfields proposed for our use in the United
Kingdom, where a total of 1 5 airdromes-8 in England, 2 in Scotland,
and 5 in Northern Ireland-were earmarked for American use by the
RAF." In December, plans finally narrowed the selection of air-
dromes to be prepared for the first American bomber units to 8 fields
then under construction for No. 8 Group of RAF Bomber Command
in the Huntingdon area.ss Though not completed until well into 1942,
they were ready to receive the American flyers in June.
While the construction of bases proceeded, Generals Arnold and
Eaker raised the question of the advisability of locating the American
forces in the more northerly region of Yorkshire. There the bombers
would be closer to projected supply and maintenance facilities in the
neighborhood of Liverpool. In addition to the saving on transporta-
tion, Arnold and Eaker felt that the York area possibly offered
greater room for expansion.goThe suggestion received some support
among responsible officers of the RAF, but it would have involved
readjustment of plans to which considerable commitments already
had been made and a sacrifice of advantages to be derived from the
close proximity of the American and British bomber commands.
Accordingly, by early May the question had been definitely decided
in favor of the Huntingdon area.g1 In this area and adjacent parts of
630

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.