“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the latter policy had in effect already been adopted, as General Eaker
well understood.
It had been decided in December 1941that American bomber units,
a t least initially, would be based in the general area of Huntingdon
and East Anglia, a section of England lying above London and known
to Americans chiefly as a principal source of the Puritan emigration
to New England in the seventeenth century. Because of the time
required for the construction of airdromes and their fundamental
importance to any plan for combined operations, the British and
American staffs had given the question consideration at an early date.
According to information used by the American Air Staff in August
I 94 I , when it was engaged in the drafting of AWPD/ I , there would
be available for American use after the RAF had reached maximum
strength 105 airdromes for bombers and 2 5 for pursuit planes.s6 Told
of the scale of operations contemplated by the Americans, the RAF
notified the AAF in the following December that airdrome accom-
modations for 2 , 3 0 0 American heavy bombers could be made ready
by June 1943." American officers had undertaken in October and
November a survey of airfields proposed for our use in the United
Kingdom, where a total of 1 5 airdromes-8 in England, 2 in Scotland,
and 5 in Northern Ireland-were earmarked for American use by the
RAF." In December, plans finally narrowed the selection of air-
dromes to be prepared for the first American bomber units to 8 fields
then under construction for No. 8 Group of RAF Bomber Command
in the Huntingdon area.ss Though not completed until well into 1942,
they were ready to receive the American flyers in June.
While the construction of bases proceeded, Generals Arnold and
Eaker raised the question of the advisability of locating the American
forces in the more northerly region of Yorkshire. There the bombers
would be closer to projected supply and maintenance facilities in the
neighborhood of Liverpool. In addition to the saving on transporta-
tion, Arnold and Eaker felt that the York area possibly offered
greater room for expansion.goThe suggestion received some support
among responsible officers of the RAF, but it would have involved
readjustment of plans to which considerable commitments already
had been made and a sacrifice of advantages to be derived from the
close proximity of the American and British bomber commands.
Accordingly, by early May the question had been definitely decided
in favor of the Huntingdon area.g1 In this area and adjacent parts of
630