Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
and served in England for the indoctrination of newly arrived units."
During the months following submission of his report to General
Chaney, General Eaker and his staff also formulated detailed plans
for the establishment of a training organization in the British Isles.
They planned that all training at first would be conducted under
direction of Bomber Command, and made arrangements for the ac-
quisition from the RAF of a nearly completed installation a t Boving-
don in Hertfordshire, northwest of London, and of its satellite field
at Oakley. Eaker requested still another site (the choice eventually
fell on Cheddington, near Bovingdon) for use in the training of fighter
units. Necessary personnel and equipment were requested from the
United States, and training schedules adjusted to the requirements
of the initial groups expected in May were presented to USAFBI."
These schedules were revised upward in May upon receipt of informa-
tion that the build-up planned for the Eighth called for thirty combat
groups, both bomber and fighter, to reach the United Kingdom by
October 1942.'~Accordingly, the Americans now requested a total
of eight airdromes for use in training, three to be used for fighter
pilots and five for bomber crews. Because of the R A F s reluctance
to use for training purposes badly needed operational airdromes in
England, the British recommended that the Eighth consider the use
of Ulster (Northern Ireland), where seven airdromes could be made
available for the purpose.73 Such was the arrangement agreed upon
as through May and June plans for a training establishment took shape.
Since it was intended that organized tactical units on arrival would
go directly to their permanent stations for familiarization and final
pre-combat training, the interest in special training installations arose
from concern for the problem of replacement.'* General Eaker had
calculated, on the basis of British experience which admittedly was
not entirely valid for daylight operations, that American bomber
losses would average 5 per cent per mission on the basis of ten mis-
sions a month, and 3 per cent for twelve missions per month in the
case of fighter^.?^ T o assure operation of each unit a t maximum
strength, the projected training establishment would serve principally
to provide combat crew replacement centers (CCRC) from which
fully trained crews could be supplied as combat losses occurred. At
the Arnold-Portal conference in London late in May, it was agreed
that the RAF would provide eight fields for CCRC's by September
1942 and a total of sixteen by the following April.76 In June 1942,
62 7

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.