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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
and served in England for the indoctrination of newly arrived units."
During the months following submission of his report to General
Chaney, General Eaker and his staff also formulated detailed plans
for the establishment of a training organization in the British Isles.
They planned that all training at first would be conducted under
direction of Bomber Command, and made arrangements for the ac-
quisition from the RAF of a nearly completed installation a t Boving-
don in Hertfordshire, northwest of London, and of its satellite field
at Oakley. Eaker requested still another site (the choice eventually
fell on Cheddington, near Bovingdon) for use in the training of fighter
units. Necessary personnel and equipment were requested from the
United States, and training schedules adjusted to the requirements
of the initial groups expected in May were presented to USAFBI."
These schedules were revised upward in May upon receipt of informa-
tion that the build-up planned for the Eighth called for thirty combat
groups, both bomber and fighter, to reach the United Kingdom by
October 1942.'~Accordingly, the Americans now requested a total
of eight airdromes for use in training, three to be used for fighter
pilots and five for bomber crews. Because of the R A F s reluctance
to use for training purposes badly needed operational airdromes in
England, the British recommended that the Eighth consider the use
of Ulster (Northern Ireland), where seven airdromes could be made
available for the purpose.73 Such was the arrangement agreed upon
as through May and June plans for a training establishment took shape.
Since it was intended that organized tactical units on arrival would
go directly to their permanent stations for familiarization and final
pre-combat training, the interest in special training installations arose
from concern for the problem of replacement.'* General Eaker had
calculated, on the basis of British experience which admittedly was
not entirely valid for daylight operations, that American bomber
losses would average 5 per cent per mission on the basis of ten mis-
sions a month, and 3 per cent for twelve missions per month in the
case of fighter^.?^ T o assure operation of each unit a t maximum
strength, the projected training establishment would serve principally
to provide combat crew replacement centers (CCRC) from which
fully trained crews could be supplied as combat losses occurred. At
the Arnold-Portal conference in London late in May, it was agreed
that the RAF would provide eight fields for CCRC's by September
1942 and a total of sixteen by the following April.76 In June 1942,
62 7

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.