“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
and served in England for the indoctrination of newly arrived units."
During the months following submission of his report to General
Chaney, General Eaker and his staff also formulated detailed plans
for the establishment of a training organization in the British Isles.
They planned that all training at first would be conducted under
direction of Bomber Command, and made arrangements for the ac-
quisition from the RAF of a nearly completed installation a t Boving-
don in Hertfordshire, northwest of London, and of its satellite field
at Oakley. Eaker requested still another site (the choice eventually
fell on Cheddington, near Bovingdon) for use in the training of fighter
units. Necessary personnel and equipment were requested from the
United States, and training schedules adjusted to the requirements
of the initial groups expected in May were presented to USAFBI."
These schedules were revised upward in May upon receipt of informa-
tion that the build-up planned for the Eighth called for thirty combat
groups, both bomber and fighter, to reach the United Kingdom by
October 1942.'~Accordingly, the Americans now requested a total
of eight airdromes for use in training, three to be used for fighter
pilots and five for bomber crews. Because of the R A F s reluctance
to use for training purposes badly needed operational airdromes in
England, the British recommended that the Eighth consider the use
of Ulster (Northern Ireland), where seven airdromes could be made
available for the purpose.73 Such was the arrangement agreed upon
as through May and June plans for a training establishment took shape.
Since it was intended that organized tactical units on arrival would
go directly to their permanent stations for familiarization and final
pre-combat training, the interest in special training installations arose
from concern for the problem of replacement.'* General Eaker had
calculated, on the basis of British experience which admittedly was
not entirely valid for daylight operations, that American bomber
losses would average 5 per cent per mission on the basis of ten mis-
sions a month, and 3 per cent for twelve missions per month in the
case of fighter^.?^ T o assure operation of each unit a t maximum
strength, the projected training establishment would serve principally
to provide combat crew replacement centers (CCRC) from which
fully trained crews could be supplied as combat losses occurred. At
the Arnold-Portal conference in London late in May, it was agreed
that the RAF would provide eight fields for CCRC's by September
1942 and a total of sixteen by the following April.76 In June 1942,
62 7