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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Eighth Air Force planes over the North Atlantic route, the last leg
of which, from Iceland to Prestwick, fell under British control.
Much of the equipment necessary to this movement was supplied by
the British, who provided for many of our planes, after arrival in
England, equipment which could not be made available in the United
States.“
The airdromes initially taken over by the Americans were equipped
with RAF communications facilities, which continued to be staffed
largely by RAF technical personnel.66 As the Americans developed
their own installations, the British telephone and teletype networks
were extended to include them. All radar equipment and most of
the radio equipment used by the Eighth Air Force during 1942 and
well into 1943 was of British design and manufacture; at the same
time, maintenance for radio equipment was provided by the Civilian
Repair Organization, which functioned under the control of the Min-
istry of Aircraft Production.67 In the opinion of the signal officer
of the VIII Bomber Command in November 1942, the “only reason
that U.S. Groups have gotten along so well with regard to com-
munications until now is because the RAF have been very generous
in supplying Signal Officers and additional personnel.” 6 8 That was
hardly an overstatement, for in August 1942 the Eighth Air Force
remained almost completely dependent upon the British for both
ground and ground-to-air communications.
T h e necessity for integrated action with the British, in this and
other fields, naturally posed special problems of training, a subject
which consumed much time and effort during the spring and summer
of 1942. An American proposal in September 1941 that the RAF
provide equipment and personnel to familiarize AAF fighter squadrons
with special RAF methods indicates an early appreciation of the
fundamental importance of adjustment in the training program within
the United States.6g General Eaker’s report of 2 0 March lent new
emphasis to this necessity, and was followed by helpful efforts to
establish and maintain close liaison between the theater and those
charged with training in the United States. Preparation of training
data was the responsibility of the bomber command G-3 section,
which under the direction of Col. Frank A. Armstrong assembled
materials for a special training manual. Concerned chiefly with the
problems of heavy bomber units, it was sent on its completion in
June to the United States for use by operational training units there
626

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.