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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
Central Interpretation Unit.61 AAF officers in various categories con-
tinued to receive training in British intelligence schools throughout
the war.
Similarly, the Eighth Air Force long remained dependent on the
British for essential weather services. But in line with AAF policy to
make the American air force as independent of the RAF as was
practicable, General Eaker urged in March a prompt dispatch of
weather officers “to begin the study of this beastly weather.” H e
emphasized the basic importance of weather forecasts to the type
of operations planned for the American bombers, and in his appeal to
General Spaatz observed that it was all right “to say ‘get it from
the British,’ but we want to be self-supporting as soon as possible
and it takes weather people to get it from the British and to transmit
it.77 6 2 In response to this request, the 18th Weather Squadron was
activated at Bolling Field in May, and shipped to England in August.
On its arrival, a weather school conducted by American personnel
at High Wycombe was established, and liaison with RAF weather
services was promptly a c c ~ m p l i s h e d . ~ ~No small part of the training
required involved an introduction to the organization, procedure,
techniques, and terminology employed by the British, for they con-
tinued to be the major source of weather information.
Integration with the British communications system naturally pre-
sented one of the more fundamental problems antecedent to opera-
tions-a problem that in its solution would leave a mark upon the
organizational as well as the operational history of the Eighth. The
RAF had developed an elaborate system, based on extensive radio
and radar installations, for the control of air traffic over the United
Kingdom. It was necessary, of course, that American and British
forces operate subject to one control; and every advantage lay in
having the Americans, by such adjustment of equipment and training
as might be necessary, fitted into the already established and highly
efficient British system. The overriding importance of this problem
had brought AAF communications experts into close consultation
with their counterparts in the RAF as early as January 1942 in an
effort to determine the communications requirements of American
aircraft to operate from England and to translate their conclusions
into practical terms of production and m~dification.~~This prompt
action made possible the provision of at least minimum equipment
for air-to-ground communication for flights during the summer of
6 2 5

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.