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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 ing force to General Eaker and his staff during their study of the RAF Bomber Command in February and Tables of organization for AAF tactical groups were weak in combat intelligence categories, and since the AAF intelligence school at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, did not open until March 1942, it proved impossible to fill even the limited number of jobs authorized. General Eaker in his report of 2 0 March observed that “Intelligence represents the section of activity in which we are weakest,” and concluded “after studying their [Brit- ish] intelligence work that we can do no better initially than to model their establishment with but slight change.” 5 5 Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF Bomber Command, and in May the first of these arri~ed.~’In an intelligence school established at High Wycombe they received a week of orientation before being sent on to the British The VIII Bomber Command requested an additional 165 intelligence officers in July under a plan to reach the total of 198 by I September. 5 8 General Eaker and Lt. Harris B. Hull, his intelli- gence officer, had recommended in March 6 intelligence officers for each squadron, 7 for each group headquarters, 7 at wing head- quarters, and 32 for bomber command headquarters-these to assume the normal responsibility for preparation of target data, photo inter- pretation, prisoner of war interrogation, enemy order of battle, the maintenance of intelligence libraries, preparation of summaries and reports, and, in addition, for public relations.59New tables of organ- ization for the various echelons of the AAF published during 1942 did not provide for intelligence officers in these numbers, but they did reflect an attempt to provide more adequately than theretofore for the intelligence function.“ Reliance on the RAF and other British agencies for intelligence would characterize the American air effort in Europe throughout the war, and this was especially true of intelligence in its more funda- mental aspects. Possessed of long-established and well-organized in- telligence services, the British initially supplied the Eighth with most of the information from which it prepared its target data. The Ameri- cans developed in time increasingly helpful services of their own, but it was decided wisely a t the outset to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by placing American personnel in already existing British organizations. It was agreed, for instance, that the RAF would t r p American officers in photo interpretation for assignment to its own 624
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