“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
mission, which of course included protection of our own bases in
Britain, continuing in the experienced hands of the RAF Fighter
Command. General Spaatz defined the primary function of the AAF
fighter planes as that of supporting “our bombers in an effort to secure
air Supremacy and not for the defense of England,’’ but he agreed
that they should be so trained as to permit their assumption of
defensive obligations in the event of an emergency.47 O n this basis
the decision was finally made.48 T h e R A F would be responsible for
aerial defense of the sectors in which American airdromes were lo-
cated, and AAF fighter forces would be committed principally to the
escort of bomber strikes against the continent. It had been agreed
between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal,
Chief of Air Staff, RAF, in May that the Americans, in line with an
earlier decision dividing production responsibilities between the air-
craft industries of the two countries, would assume a primary re-
sponsibility for the provision of air transport, even for the training
of British airborne division^.^' Thus in the great airborne operations
that followed, American troop carrier units would provide most of
the lift.
T h e defensive responsibilities assumed by the British included anti-
aircraft and other ground defense of American airdromes. T h e AAF
had assumed in the earliest planning for a bomber command that such
an arrangement could be effe~ted,~’but as the number of our projected
installations increased, it became apparent that British forces would
be unequal to the task. Steps had been taken as early as August to
set up an air defense organization within the Eighth Air Force,‘l but
American antiaircraft and infantry units could not be made available
even in the number required to supplement those provided by the
British, much less in sufficient quantity to replace them.52 Our allies
consequently continued to carry the main responsibility into the early
part of 1943, a t which time the Eighth Air Force took over the job
with forces hardly more adequate than those the British had been able
to At no time during the war, fortunately, did the Germans
undertake large-scale attacks on American installations in the United
Kingdom.
T h e heaviest indebtedness of the Eighth to its British allies fell,
perhaps, in the field of intelligence. When war began, the AAF prob-
ably was more deficient in its provision for intelligence than in any
other phase of its activities-a deficiency brought home with increas-
6 2 3