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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
tween British and American comrnander~.~~On undertaking the
establishment of a headquarters at High Wycombe (PINETREE in
code) that would serve for the immediate direction of American
bomber operations, General Eaker followed as far as was possible
the organization of the near-by RAF Bomber Command, thus achiev-
ing a measure of organizational similarity designed to facilitate co-
operation. By 18 May he was able to notify Spaatz that the bomber
headquarters should be ready to “control and supervise in bombard-
ment operations by the 1st of June.” 4 3 The tardy arrival of the first
combat units obviated any test of that promise in June, but plans
for close co-ordination with the RAF proceeded along lines that
permitted the prompt adoption of formal agreements following the
arrival of General Spaatz. Early in July, the RAF invited the Eighth
Air Force to share membership on some of the more important RAF
operational committees-those dealing with targets, operational re-
search, interception, and bomber operation^.^^ Composed of senior
staff officers for the study of operations data as a guide to policy,
these committees thus took an important step toward their trans-
formation into combined committees representative of the two air
forces. Close personal agreement having theretofore marked the rela-
tions between General Eaker, who continued to command the VIII
Bomber Command, and Air Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, command-
ing the RAF Bomber Command, they further agreed on the eve of
the Eighth‘s entry into combat that Eaker, or his representative,
would attend the daily operations conference held by Harris and that
the two commands would co-ordinate action for the selection of
targets and the issuance of communiquCs or other press releases.45
The pattern of collaboration thus established for bomber operations
was promptly followed by the two fighter commands.
Not until November 1942 was a definitive understanding with the
British reached on the most fundamental question arising from the
purpose to base American fighter planes in the United Kingdom.
The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually to assign entire defensive sectors of
the United Kingdom to AAF operational The suggestion
had obvious administrative advantages to recommend it, but it would
have involved the assumption of heavy responsibilities for defense of
the British Isles. The AAF preferred that all of its forces be con-
centrated in an offensive effort against Germany, with the defensive
6 22

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.