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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E E I G H T H A I R F O R C E
organizations in the British Isles.41 It remained the ranking AAF
command until the opening of General Spaatz’ headquarters on
18 June.
The preparatory effort which meantime fell under Eaker’s direc-
tion may be conveniently divided into two broad categories-logistics
and operations. In either category much of the work consisted of
planning, for the immediate future or on a long-range basis. It was
natural that actual accomplishments were largely within the realm of
logistics, for before the bomber campaign could begin much had
to be done in such important if unspectacular fields as supply, mainte-
nance, transportation, technical training, and housekeeping. Opera-
tions in the narrowest sense could begin only with the first attack
on the enemy, but even when conceived in the usual fashion to
include operational training and the development of auxiliary opera-
tional techniques, the Eighth was long handicapped by lack of combat
planes and of tactical experience.
It was possible to draw upon the rich operational experience of the
RAF, however, and during the spring and early summer of 1942,
basic decisions in the field of operational planning prepared the way
for a degree of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two great nations. The story
provides another significant chapter in the long history of Anglo-
American relations. If a t times leaders of the RAF tended to view
paternally the untried theories of the AAF and displayed an under-
standable disposition to guide the Americans along paths tested in
the bitter experience of actual combat, they at the same time under-
stood and respected the organizational capacity and the experimental
temperament of the people with whom they were now allied. And if
the Americans were inclined to insist upon the establishment of a
completely independent air force, one that would be copartner and
not junior partner in the assault on Germany, they also represented
an organization that for over two years had sought helpful lessons in
the experience of the RAF and had found there proof of its own
basic assumptions. Differences on certain matters would persist
throughout the war, as was only natural, but to the many ties which
joined the two peoples there was added in this instance the bond
that makes all airmen one.
The Eaker plan of 20 March assumed that in the highly important
field of target selection the work would be done in conference be-
6 2 I

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.