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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Independence Day”9 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 The Joint Directif gave no indication that the RAF had been con- vinced of the soundness of American doctrines-only that the doc- trines’ trial by wager of battle would be given British support. The document was, however, indicative of the mutual respect that char- acterized the relations of the two air forces. This attitude was not always appreciated by the public. Newspaper stories tended to mag- nify honest differences of opinion into serious disputes, and the Eighth‘s long delay in getting into action seemed to lend substance to this view. On 8 August the New York Times published an article by John MacCormac under the head “British-U.S. Rift on Planes Holding Up Air Offensive.” The gist of the argument was that American co-operation in the bomber offensive was behind schedule and perhaps permanently impaired because of serious disagreements concerning U.S. heavy bombers and bombardment theories-specifi- cally, “because of British-American inability to agree on methods or objectives.” The article showed little understanding of the situation. Only a week before, Eaker had written Sir Arthur Harris, “I shall continue to look upon you as the senior member in our firm-the elder brother in our bomber team,” 2 2 8 and Harris had replied: “I am personally in the fullest agreement with the methods of cooperation which you propose and supremely confident that, at least as long as we retain our respective assignments, no difficulties of either an opera- tional or a personal nature can conceivably arise between us.” 229 The VIII Bomber Command got off to a late start not because of quarrels over the teacups with the RAF, but because of difficulties in logistics and training which will be described in the next chapter. The New York Times story, because it had appeared in so in- fluential a journal, was repudiated by Eisenhower and spa at^.^^' It was not the last in which rivalry between AAF and RAF was played up. A month later Spaatz condemned the American tendency to belittle the RAF and their bombing effort. This, in spite of the fact that . . . the only force that is pounding hell out of Germany is the RAF. This does not mean that I am an enthusiastic supporter of all they do. They were wrong in their analysis of what can be done with daylight bombing but they have the benefit of a hell of a lot of experience, and when they analyze anything it is with the background of that experience.231 When Spaatz wrote this, the Eighth Air Force had received its baptism of fire and he could himself draw on a modicum of experience. But in spite of the dramatic success of the initial B- I 7 missions, high- 610
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