“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
Eaker’s report gave then an affirmative, if cautious, reply to Spaatz’
question as to the feasibility of daylight operations. The report was
favorably received in Wa~hington,”~and when Spaatz arrived in
England in mid-June he was still inclined to accept its verdict. It is
true that the adoption of BOLERO had involved a sharp reorientation
in air strategy: the long-term bombardment campaign had become less
important than counterair activities and close support. Thus, the
mission assigned to the Eighth Air Force by General Eisenhower
on 2 1 July was, in collaboration with the RAF, “to initiate imme-
diately the maximum degree of air operations with a view to obtaining
and maintaining domination of the air over Western France by
I April 1943 and be prepared to furnish the maximum support to
the forward movement of U.S. Army ground forces by late summer
1942.”2 2 4 Yet while Spaatz and his staff were preparing to execute
that mission, the heavy bomber program as originally conceived was
not entirely abandoned, and the change from BOLERO to T O R C H
released the Eighth Air Force from any immediate concern with close
support for a cross-Channel push. Thus, on I August, Eaker could
describe the mission of the VIII Bomber Command in terms wholly
consistent with those of his 2 0 March report: the destruction of
carefully chosen strategic targets. The experimental nature of the
task was still evident in the directive he issued: “A subsidiary purpose
of our early bombing operations will be to determine our capacity to
destroy pinpoint targets by daylight accuracy bombing and our ability
to beat off fighter opposition and to evade antiaircraft opposition.” 2 2 5
Because of diversions of bomber units to TORCH and the Pacific,
the “subsidiary purpose” was to be the main purpose for almost a year.
Eaker’s statement implied that the tests would involve penetration
by unescorted bombers, and indeed until fighter range could be
stepped up appreciably any missions into Germany proper must be
flown by the heavies alone. But there was no intention of throwing
the first handful of B-17’s in a daylight stab at Berlin: initial efforts
should be exerted tentatively within fighter radius of southeast Eng-
land. Throughout negotiations with the British, Arnold, Spaatz, and
Eaker had resisted all attempts to integrate U.S. pursuit units with
RAF groups charged with defense of England; AAF fighters should
be a part of the striking force with the primary duty of escorting
bombers.226But in August it was obvious that for want of fighter
strength RAF Fighter Command would have to furnish most of the
607