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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cooper”10 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N Eaker’s report gave then an affirmative, if cautious, reply to Spaatz’ question as to the feasibility of daylight operations. The report was favorably received in Wa~hington,”~and when Spaatz arrived in England in mid-June he was still inclined to accept its verdict. It is true that the adoption of BOLERO had involved a sharp reorientation in air strategy: the long-term bombardment campaign had become less important than counterair activities and close support. Thus, the mission assigned to the Eighth Air Force by General Eisenhower on 2 1 July was, in collaboration with the RAF, “to initiate imme- diately the maximum degree of air operations with a view to obtaining and maintaining domination of the air over Western France by I April 1943 and be prepared to furnish the maximum support to the forward movement of U.S. Army ground forces by late summer 1942.”2 2 4 Yet while Spaatz and his staff were preparing to execute that mission, the heavy bomber program as originally conceived was not entirely abandoned, and the change from BOLERO to T O R C H released the Eighth Air Force from any immediate concern with close support for a cross-Channel push. Thus, on I August, Eaker could describe the mission of the VIII Bomber Command in terms wholly consistent with those of his 2 0 March report: the destruction of carefully chosen strategic targets. The experimental nature of the task was still evident in the directive he issued: “A subsidiary purpose of our early bombing operations will be to determine our capacity to destroy pinpoint targets by daylight accuracy bombing and our ability to beat off fighter opposition and to evade antiaircraft opposition.” 2 2 5 Because of diversions of bomber units to TORCH and the Pacific, the “subsidiary purpose” was to be the main purpose for almost a year. Eaker’s statement implied that the tests would involve penetration by unescorted bombers, and indeed until fighter range could be stepped up appreciably any missions into Germany proper must be flown by the heavies alone. But there was no intention of throwing the first handful of B-17’s in a daylight stab at Berlin: initial efforts should be exerted tentatively within fighter radius of southeast Eng- land. Throughout negotiations with the British, Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker had resisted all attempts to integrate U.S. pursuit units with RAF groups charged with defense of England; AAF fighters should be a part of the striking force with the primary duty of escorting bombers.226But in August it was obvious that for want of fighter strength RAF Fighter Command would have to furnish most of the 607
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