The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
mission, Bomber Command’s efforts had been diffused in attacks on
nonstrategic targets so that it had been impossible to accept the
heavier losses which daylight operations would involve. Economy in
materials and in production man-hours favored the night bomber;
easier maintenance, smaller crews, and, above all, smaller losses, fa-
vored night operations. Just as the British had earlier admitted that
they might eventually turn to day bombing, so Eaker was willing,
if necessary, to give British methods a trial. AWPD/I had assumed
that toward the end of the bomber campaign the AAF might turn
to area bombing of cities to give the coup de grdce to German morale,
but Eaker was interested in the more immediate future. So soon as a
satisfactory flame dampener could be developed for his heavy bombers
and crews could be specially trained, he proposed to use his force
“both day and night.”
This was in keeping with the experimental tone which pervaded
the whole report. Eaker was keenly aware of the great fund of ex-
perience which the RAF had built up in two and a half years of war,
and he hoped to profit both from their successes and from their
errors. But he was still convinced that the AAF’s chief contribution
would be through operations of the type for which its equipment
and training had been designed. Daylight bombing would make
navigation and location of targets easier. Operational, as opposed to
combat, losses would be fewer. But, above all, it was only by follow-
ing approved AAF practice that bombardment could approach
precision standards. This would require, in addition to skillful
bombardiers, intensive training in evasive action, formation flying, and
gunnery. It would require, too, an adequate force, regular replace-
ments, and high morale. In the initial stages operations should be of
shallow penetration only so that some protection might be had from
fighter escorts with limited range, and targets and methods of attack
should be varied constantly to confuse the defense. This applied to
the Anglo-American combined effort as well, and Eaker stressed
the positive value of a co-ordinated day-night attack on Germany.
Such a program would abate congestion in British skies, already over-
crowded with planes. It would allow the AAF and RAF to specialize
on the type of targets and tactics for which each was best qualified.
And by keeping German defenses on the alert around the clock,
the combined attack in the long run would reduce both American
and British losses.
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