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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
its functions were extended to include an investigation of “poor
bombing results” in the European theater. From midsummer until
the end of 1941,the board continued its study of bombardment in
England and in the United States. The analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe
operations did little to change current unflattering estimates, but the
report on AAF bombardment rendered on 2 January 1942left little
cause for complacency.21TT h e remarkable scores achieved by the
AAF had been made under ideal conditions: experienced crews flying
in the cloudless-and flakless-skies of the American Southwest.
AWPD/I would have to be accomplished by crews trained in the
hastily expanding air force. Bombing accuracy a t present was far
below the capabilities of existing equipment-as, in fact, it was to be
throughout the war. Few crews were sufficiently trained for night
bombing to justify adopting RAF practice, and indeed there was “no
bombardment unit of the Air Forces ready for combat operations in
any theater without a minimum of three months additional train-
ing.” ’’’ This was a serious condition in an air force already at war.
The board suggested certain remedial steps in regard to training and
recommended that no unit be committed to an active theater until it
had demonstrated its proficiency by specific achievement tests.
The exigencies of war made this last item impractical, but in gen-
eral the report was enthusiastically received.’l’ O n 26 February,
Arnold established the Bombardment Tactical Committee consisting
of five bombardment experts, and specialists on antiaircraft artillery,
radar, and meteorology. The committee was charged with “preparing
the doctrines, tactics, and technique of employment of air forces in the
European theater,” and of making recommendations for improvements
in training and equipment necessary thereto.’20 In the meanwhile,
work toward the same ends had begun in the theater.
General Eaker had arrived in England on 2 0 February to prepare
for the reception of the USAFBI bomber command. Among other
duties he was charged with studying the doctrines and operational
and he had been advised
by Spaatz to exhaust fully the possibilities of daylight bombing. His
long report of 2 0 March contained, therefore, a critique of British
doctrines and an estimate of AAF capabilities.222Several weeks of
observation had given Eaker a healthy respect for Bomber Com-
mand’s work, and he tended to justify rather than condemn their
choice of night operations. With forces inadequate to the primary
, procedures of RAF Bomber
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.