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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
its functions were extended to include an investigation of “poor
bombing results” in the European theater. From midsummer until
the end of 1941,the board continued its study of bombardment in
England and in the United States. The analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe
operations did little to change current unflattering estimates, but the
report on AAF bombardment rendered on 2 January 1942left little
cause for complacency.21TT h e remarkable scores achieved by the
AAF had been made under ideal conditions: experienced crews flying
in the cloudless-and flakless-skies of the American Southwest.
AWPD/I would have to be accomplished by crews trained in the
hastily expanding air force. Bombing accuracy a t present was far
below the capabilities of existing equipment-as, in fact, it was to be
throughout the war. Few crews were sufficiently trained for night
bombing to justify adopting RAF practice, and indeed there was “no
bombardment unit of the Air Forces ready for combat operations in
any theater without a minimum of three months additional train-
ing.” ’’’ This was a serious condition in an air force already at war.
The board suggested certain remedial steps in regard to training and
recommended that no unit be committed to an active theater until it
had demonstrated its proficiency by specific achievement tests.
The exigencies of war made this last item impractical, but in gen-
eral the report was enthusiastically received.’l’ O n 26 February,
Arnold established the Bombardment Tactical Committee consisting
of five bombardment experts, and specialists on antiaircraft artillery,
radar, and meteorology. The committee was charged with “preparing
the doctrines, tactics, and technique of employment of air forces in the
European theater,” and of making recommendations for improvements
in training and equipment necessary thereto.’20 In the meanwhile,
work toward the same ends had begun in the theater.
General Eaker had arrived in England on 2 0 February to prepare
for the reception of the USAFBI bomber command. Among other
duties he was charged with studying the doctrines and operational
and he had been advised
by Spaatz to exhaust fully the possibilities of daylight bombing. His
long report of 2 0 March contained, therefore, a critique of British
doctrines and an estimate of AAF capabilities.222Several weeks of
observation had given Eaker a healthy respect for Bomber Com-
mand’s work, and he tended to justify rather than condemn their
choice of night operations. With forces inadequate to the primary
, procedures of RAF Bomber
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