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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 370 …Reichers took a route by way of Cairo across central Africa, the South Atlantic, and up…
  • p. 371 …I 0,000 miles separated Miami from Cairo.23An airplane leaving southern Florida traveled 4,000…
  • p. 372 …of Africa and across central Africa to Cairo. Ferrying operations over the South Atlantic route had…
  • p. 375 …Takoradi following the completion of deliveries to Cairo, and for hauling critical items of supply east…
  • p. 378 …7 December the service was extended to Cairo and beyond.54 Before operations could begin, Pan…
  • p. 379 …Maxwell had been established at Cairo on I 3 September 1941, with responsibilities similar to those…
  • p. 380 …to the opening of a service to Cairo over the South Atlantic route. Two survey flights…
  • p. 381 …R Y I N G Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important military…
  • p. 382 …of the bombers departed Bolling Field for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across…
  • p. 385 …Lend-lease planes for Russia were flown through Cairo to Basra or to Tehran, where they…
  • p. 387 …for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more exposed to attack, Takoradi and…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 390 …24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The first step was to establish a ferrying…
  • p. 391 …parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from…
  • p. 395 …assembled and then ferried across Africa to Cairo. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the…
  • p. 407 …Harbor, first to Britain and later to Cairo, had been little more than courier services and…
  • p. 411 …from their normal operations between Washington and Cairo and sent to the Far East. A plan…
  • p. 412 …Kester-the pilot who had inaugurated the Washington- Cairo transport service in November-was lost off…
  • p. 413 …In February, Transcontinental & Western Air began operating a shuttle service from Washington to Cairo, using two…
  • p. 629 …5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the…
  • p. 630 …one group of heavies set up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial…
  • p. 778 …CM-IN, MA Cairo to M E I D 65. CM-IN, London (Brett) to Trip…
  • p. 779 …1942; CM- IN, Cairo (Fellen) to T A G (Adler for Arnold), 8754 Amseg, 3 Feb…
  • p. 786 …1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb. IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T…
  • p. 830 …BOLERO BR CAA C/AAF C/AC CAIRO C/AS C A T F CCRC CCS…
  • p. 844 …5 Cagayan (Mindanao), 219 Cagayan Valley, 208 Cairo, 3 1 ~ 2 1 , 325-26, 328-29…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
its functions were extended to include an investigation of “poor
bombing results” in the European theater. From midsummer until
the end of 1941,the board continued its study of bombardment in
England and in the United States. The analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe
operations did little to change current unflattering estimates, but the
report on AAF bombardment rendered on 2 January 1942left little
cause for complacency.21TT h e remarkable scores achieved by the
AAF had been made under ideal conditions: experienced crews flying
in the cloudless-and flakless-skies of the American Southwest.
AWPD/I would have to be accomplished by crews trained in the
hastily expanding air force. Bombing accuracy a t present was far
below the capabilities of existing equipment-as, in fact, it was to be
throughout the war. Few crews were sufficiently trained for night
bombing to justify adopting RAF practice, and indeed there was “no
bombardment unit of the Air Forces ready for combat operations in
any theater without a minimum of three months additional train-
ing.” ’’’ This was a serious condition in an air force already at war.
The board suggested certain remedial steps in regard to training and
recommended that no unit be committed to an active theater until it
had demonstrated its proficiency by specific achievement tests.
The exigencies of war made this last item impractical, but in gen-
eral the report was enthusiastically received.’l’ O n 26 February,
Arnold established the Bombardment Tactical Committee consisting
of five bombardment experts, and specialists on antiaircraft artillery,
radar, and meteorology. The committee was charged with “preparing
the doctrines, tactics, and technique of employment of air forces in the
European theater,” and of making recommendations for improvements
in training and equipment necessary thereto.’20 In the meanwhile,
work toward the same ends had begun in the theater.
General Eaker had arrived in England on 2 0 February to prepare
for the reception of the USAFBI bomber command. Among other
duties he was charged with studying the doctrines and operational
and he had been advised
by Spaatz to exhaust fully the possibilities of daylight bombing. His
long report of 2 0 March contained, therefore, a critique of British
doctrines and an estimate of AAF capabilities.222Several weeks of
observation had given Eaker a healthy respect for Bomber Com-
mand’s work, and he tended to justify rather than condemn their
choice of night operations. With forces inadequate to the primary
, procedures of RAF Bomber
605

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.