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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
mations but immediately began an investigation of means to increase
the firepower of U.S. bombers. After making a detailed comparison
of the British Stirling and Manchester with the Fortress One, AWPD
recommended that the B-17 and B-24 be equipped with ten machine
guns, mounted in turrets where possible. This followed RAF practice
as to number, but the guns were to be heavier, of .50 caliber rather
than . 3 0 3 . Better equipment for oxygen and heating should be de-
veloped, and a board of officers should be named to draw up charac-
teristics for a long-range escort plane.z11
The recommendation for increased armament was followed imme-
diately, and the B-I~E-the first model to be used in combat by the
Eighth Air Force-was the most heavily armed bomber in the theater.
The design for the escort plane was slower in its evolution. The fail-
ure to have developed such a plane was the most serious flaw in the
AAF’s program, and it is difficult to account for. Again, the fact that
national defense rather than strategic bombardment against European
powers had been the prevailing influence in the twenties and early
thirties must have been important.212The effect of Douhet’s writings
a t the Air Corps Tactical School has been referred to above,” and
Douhet taught that heavily armed bombers in mass formations could
operate by day against fighter Whatever the reason, the
AAF was approaching a major war without a long-range escort for its
bomberst The type of plane recommended in AWPD/I to remedy
this lack was more akin to a modified bomber than to any existing
pursuit Eaker, on a mission to England in September 1941,
secured information which seemed to corroborate this
and eventually such an expedient was followed. Almost a year later,
in August 1942, a board headed by Brig. Gen. A.J. Lyon submitted
a plan for modifying the B-17 and B-24 into “destroyer escort
planes.” 216 That suggestion was followed, and the resulting YB-40
and YB-41 were to have a brief and unhappy trial in the ETO. But
when war came it was apparent that our early bombardment opera-
tions would be run without benefit of escorts over the target, a fact
which accentuated the need of improved techniques.
Research toward that end had paralleled those dealing with equip-
ment. A board had been established in July 1941 to evaluate bombing
accuracy in the AAF, and in response to Chaney’s recommendations,
* See above, p. 51.
+For one possible explanation, see above, pp. 64-65.
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.