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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N in air power. Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the proper targets. Conversely, Chaney believed that an allied air force, if sufficiently large and prop- erly handled, could knock Germany out of the war or a t least make easy the final invasion. This would require choice of appropriate strategic targets and prolonged concentration on each until it was totally destroyed. Most of the targets were relatively small and could best be attacked by precision techniques. That meant daylight bomb- ing, which in turn meant heavier losses. Those losses might be held to a figure commensurate with results only if AAF bombing were highly accurate. Accuracy indeed was the crux of the problem. American and Brit- ish doctrines could be evaluated according to a simple formula in which the basic factors were: Bombs on target . Presumably both factors would be greater by day than by night, but in their pro- portion lay the whole argument for or against the AAF theory. In spite of British and German experience, Chaney thought it possible to conduct a decisive daylight bomber offensive in Europe, provided operations were carried out on a massive scale and provided requisite improvements be made in equipment, training, and tactics. Chaney’s comments on bombardment “under existing war condi- tions” elicited from Arnold promise of “vigorous action,” *09 which most immediately took the form of a reappraisal of existing equip- ment and techniques. T o cast some light on the controversial question of whether the B-17 and B-24 could approach German targets by day consistently enough to accomplish the mission assigned them in A W P D / I , an analysis was made of fighter-bomber engagements in the European theater.*” T h e findings seemed to justify some of the RAF complaints. Most profitable strategic targets lay beyond the range of fighter escorts. T o escape German flak, it was necessary to operate at altitudes which made it very difficult to maintain the close formations prescribed by the Air Corps. Essentially, then, the heavy bombers should be defensively self-sufficient, and whereas the B- I 7 had exhibited great endurance under fire it had also showed little capacity for inflicting damage on attackers. Hence, a more intensive study was necessary to determine what improvements in armament were needed. T h e Air Staff was not prepared to abandon faith in defensive for- Bombers and crews lost 603
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