“Mission Control”60+ pages
- p. 40 …On recommendation of an American
mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col.
Raynal…
- p. 50 …a r I1 and its self-
conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
- p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably
by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
- p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form
an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
- p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond
its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
- p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi-
ence in World War I seemed to…
- p. 65 …Command respon-
sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com-
manding General…
- p. 66 …Navy in further-
awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School
claimed for air…
- p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate
a well-balanced air…
- p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that
the principal mission of an…
- p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid
the ground forces to gain…
- p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and
its outlying territories, but…
- p. 129 …assigned to the air force an
independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March
1918 the…
- p. 155 …By taking
control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis
powers might lodge themselves at…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 235 …Long-standing
differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of
offshore patrol had brought…
- p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas
and in Washington vested ultimate control…
- p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was
incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
- p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~
It soon became evident, however…
- p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and
later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
- p. 306 …The mission of the MAB
was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
- p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the
training of the tactical…
- p. 314 …The field forces remained under
the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
- p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com-
plete, virtually, as is…
- p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect
control from Washington through letters written more often in…
- p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at
night or during bad weather would have required…
- p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new
command was, first, “to move…
- p. 379 …A North
African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had
been established at Cairo…
- p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and
in controlling the flight along…
- p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special
missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether-
lands…
- p. 426 …formation
of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command
he was to designate…
- p. 441 …But of these, four missions
involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
- p. 458 …During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
- p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’
If the Americans on Bataan and…
- p. 472 …naval control, during which time
six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
- p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest
expenditure of time and effort. Until…
- p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
- p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the
aircrews were against the flight.
Although a fortuitous and…
- p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it
retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
- p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their
search mission, this was a…
- p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission
in April had to fight a feeling of…
- p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers-
would remain under theater control but…
- p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air
forces. As late…
- p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to
its own mission and by the end…
- p. 621 …It would
work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational
control “wherever this may…
- p. 646 …the British
Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission
at London.” The American…
- p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy
building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
- p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro-
vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 651 …Military Mission in
London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S .
Field Forces…
- p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not
willing to surrender it.1le…
- p. 659 …bombardment missions,
either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic
control of AAF operations…
- p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required
numerous modifications for the plane-about…
- p. 683 …not
be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM-
NAST. H e…
- p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con-
siderable reshuffling…
- p. 717 …develop-
ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by
establishing the Provisional I…
- p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942
HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere
charged…
- p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control.
Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
- p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro-
vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined,
but…
- p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower
spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
operations will have an effect, far in excess of its actual operational
importance, on the attitude of the RAF, the British, and the American
people toward the B-17 as a fighting plane.” ’’’
On inquiry, Brig Gen. Ralph Royce, air attach6 in London, con-
firmed disquieting reports which General Arnold had received: that
the RAF had been forced by the British government, for political and
publicity reasons, to use the Fortresses; that crew training had been
inadequate, especially in reference to use of the Sperry sight; and that
maintenance had been slow and ineffi~ient.~’~Undoubtedly there was
something to be said on both sides. The Americans saw chiefly the
negligence in maintenance and the failure to follow AAF procedures
in operations. The British saw rather the mechanical failures, the
limited armament, and the losses. Fundamentally, the difficulty lay in
the fact that no one in the RAF was eager about the planes.
A typical expression of British opinion may be found in reports by
experienced RAF pilots invited to the States as consultants in Oc-
t ~ b e r . ~ ’ ~They thought that the B-17 and B-24 might be suitable for
service in the Pacific, but that they were too lightly armed for day-
light missions over Germany-in fact, they called both “night
bombers”! Because of its heavier bomb load, they preferred the B-24
to the B-17 but considered both inferior to British heavy bombers.
The pilots spoke of the ruggedness of the B-17 under fire, but they
believed that no bomber could stand up against German defenses in
the daytime.’05 So firmly ingrained had this opinion become when
the United States entered the war that Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred
Freeman, Portal’s deputy, proposed that the B-17 and B-24 be modi-
fied for night operations and be used according to British tactics when
the AAP should be sent to England.206That suggestion received
little support in the Air Staff at Washington. “This must not,” com-
mented one member, “through frequent repetition, lead us to favor
area bombing against precision bombing which accomplishes the stra-
tegic result with fewer airplanes and fewer crews.” ‘07 Nevertheless,
RAF experience with U.S. heavy bombers suggested improvements,
if not radical changes, in both aircraft and operating techniques.
While AAF doctrines were thus under fire, they received a new in-
dorsement from General Chaney. On 5 September 1941 he completed
an analysis of the results of German bombardment in Britain during
1940.’’~The Lufnvaffe’s failure to crush British industry and morale
he attributed to German errors rather than to any weakness inherent
6 0 2