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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 operations will have an effect, far in excess of its actual operational importance, on the attitude of the RAF, the British, and the American people toward the B-17 as a fighting plane.” ’’’ On inquiry, Brig Gen. Ralph Royce, air attach6 in London, con- firmed disquieting reports which General Arnold had received: that the RAF had been forced by the British government, for political and publicity reasons, to use the Fortresses; that crew training had been inadequate, especially in reference to use of the Sperry sight; and that maintenance had been slow and ineffi~ient.~’~Undoubtedly there was something to be said on both sides. The Americans saw chiefly the negligence in maintenance and the failure to follow AAF procedures in operations. The British saw rather the mechanical failures, the limited armament, and the losses. Fundamentally, the difficulty lay in the fact that no one in the RAF was eager about the planes. A typical expression of British opinion may be found in reports by experienced RAF pilots invited to the States as consultants in Oc- t ~ b e r . ~ ’ ~They thought that the B-17 and B-24 might be suitable for service in the Pacific, but that they were too lightly armed for day- light missions over Germany-in fact, they called both “night bombers”! Because of its heavier bomb load, they preferred the B-24 to the B-17 but considered both inferior to British heavy bombers. The pilots spoke of the ruggedness of the B-17 under fire, but they believed that no bomber could stand up against German defenses in the daytime.’05 So firmly ingrained had this opinion become when the United States entered the war that Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, Portal’s deputy, proposed that the B-17 and B-24 be modi- fied for night operations and be used according to British tactics when the AAP should be sent to England.206That suggestion received little support in the Air Staff at Washington. “This must not,” com- mented one member, “through frequent repetition, lead us to favor area bombing against precision bombing which accomplishes the stra- tegic result with fewer airplanes and fewer crews.” ‘07 Nevertheless, RAF experience with U.S. heavy bombers suggested improvements, if not radical changes, in both aircraft and operating techniques. While AAF doctrines were thus under fire, they received a new in- dorsement from General Chaney. On 5 September 1941 he completed an analysis of the results of German bombardment in Britain during 1940.’’~The Lufnvaffe’s failure to crush British industry and morale he attributed to German errors rather than to any weakness inherent 6 0 2
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