The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
After analyzing German air defense, the authors of AWPD/I
came to the conclusion “that by employing large numbers of aircraft
with high speed, good defensive fire power and high altitude, it is
feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany in daylight.”
This was predicated upon the belief that U.S. bombers, initially
B-17’s and B-24’~, subsequently B-29’s and B-32’s, could beat off
attacks from fighters currently employed by the GAF. T o cope with
improved German models in the future, the AAF should begin imme-
diately development of an escort plane with speed somewhat superior
to that of heavy bombers, with equal range, great firepower, and
heavy armor.19oSeveral of the authors of AWPD/I had observed the
air war in England; they had access to RAF intelligence; they utilized
AAF bombing records to calculate the weight of attack needed to
destroy each target. But their estimates of the capabilities of the B-17
and B-24 under war conditions were unsupported by practical experi-
ence. Paradoxically, it had been the RAF, not the AAF, who had
flown U.S. h‘eavy bombers in combat, and the results had done little
to convert British opinion.
During the spring of 1941, some twenty B-I~C’Swere delivered‘to
the RAF. Initially, British aviation journals gave the “Fortress One”
an enthusiastic welcome 191 and RAF leaders regarded it “as a very
fine aeroplane.” T o take advantage of its peculiar virtues, it was
decided to employ the B-17 in very high-altitude daylight mis-
s i o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required
numerous modifications for the plane-about forty in all-and special
training for the crew. The mechanical changes were delayed, and
indoctrination of crews by AAF officers stationed in England was all
too brief.”” O n a trial run on 8 July, made before modifications were
complete, three Fortresses were dispatched to bomb the naval bar-
racks a t Wilhelmshaven from 30,000 feet. Engine trouble forced one
plane to attack a secondary objective; the other two failed to hit the
target and when attacked by GAF interceptors were unable to return
their fire.lg5Regular missions began with participation in a great day-
light attack on naval ships at Brest on 24 July; ’’’ in general, they
were as unsuccessful as had been the maiden attempt. By 12 Septem-
ber, twenty-two raids totaling thirty-nine sorties had been dispatched;
eighteen planes had aborted, two had bombed secondary targets, so
that only half had reached primary objectives. T w o were shot down
and two so badly damaged that they crashed in landing; total combat
600