“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
After analyzing German air defense, the authors of AWPD/I
came to the conclusion “that by employing large numbers of aircraft
with high speed, good defensive fire power and high altitude, it is
feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany in daylight.”
This was predicated upon the belief that U.S. bombers, initially
B-17’s and B-24’~, subsequently B-29’s and B-32’s, could beat off
attacks from fighters currently employed by the GAF. T o cope with
improved German models in the future, the AAF should begin imme-
diately development of an escort plane with speed somewhat superior
to that of heavy bombers, with equal range, great firepower, and
heavy armor.19oSeveral of the authors of AWPD/I had observed the
air war in England; they had access to RAF intelligence; they utilized
AAF bombing records to calculate the weight of attack needed to
destroy each target. But their estimates of the capabilities of the B-17
and B-24 under war conditions were unsupported by practical experi-
ence. Paradoxically, it had been the RAF, not the AAF, who had
flown U.S. h‘eavy bombers in combat, and the results had done little
to convert British opinion.
During the spring of 1941, some twenty B-I~C’Swere delivered‘to
the RAF. Initially, British aviation journals gave the “Fortress One”
an enthusiastic welcome 191 and RAF leaders regarded it “as a very
fine aeroplane.” T o take advantage of its peculiar virtues, it was
decided to employ the B-17 in very high-altitude daylight mis-
s i o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required
numerous modifications for the plane-about forty in all-and special
training for the crew. The mechanical changes were delayed, and
indoctrination of crews by AAF officers stationed in England was all
too brief.”” O n a trial run on 8 July, made before modifications were
complete, three Fortresses were dispatched to bomb the naval bar-
racks a t Wilhelmshaven from 30,000 feet. Engine trouble forced one
plane to attack a secondary objective; the other two failed to hit the
target and when attacked by GAF interceptors were unable to return
their fire.lg5Regular missions began with participation in a great day-
light attack on naval ships at Brest on 24 July; ’’’ in general, they
were as unsuccessful as had been the maiden attempt. By 12 Septem-
ber, twenty-two raids totaling thirty-nine sorties had been dispatched;
eighteen planes had aborted, two had bombed secondary targets, so
that only half had reached primary objectives. T w o were shot down
and two so badly damaged that they crashed in landing; total combat
600