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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 After analyzing German air defense, the authors of AWPD/I came to the conclusion “that by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive fire power and high altitude, it is feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany in daylight.” This was predicated upon the belief that U.S. bombers, initially B-17’s and B-24’~, subsequently B-29’s and B-32’s, could beat off attacks from fighters currently employed by the GAF. T o cope with improved German models in the future, the AAF should begin imme- diately development of an escort plane with speed somewhat superior to that of heavy bombers, with equal range, great firepower, and heavy armor.19oSeveral of the authors of AWPD/I had observed the air war in England; they had access to RAF intelligence; they utilized AAF bombing records to calculate the weight of attack needed to destroy each target. But their estimates of the capabilities of the B-17 and B-24 under war conditions were unsupported by practical experi- ence. Paradoxically, it had been the RAF, not the AAF, who had flown U.S. h‘eavy bombers in combat, and the results had done little to convert British opinion. During the spring of 1941, some twenty B-I~C’Swere delivered‘to the RAF. Initially, British aviation journals gave the “Fortress One” an enthusiastic welcome 191 and RAF leaders regarded it “as a very fine aeroplane.” T o take advantage of its peculiar virtues, it was decided to employ the B-17 in very high-altitude daylight mis- s i o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required numerous modifications for the plane-about forty in all-and special training for the crew. The mechanical changes were delayed, and indoctrination of crews by AAF officers stationed in England was all too brief.”” O n a trial run on 8 July, made before modifications were complete, three Fortresses were dispatched to bomb the naval bar- racks a t Wilhelmshaven from 30,000 feet. Engine trouble forced one plane to attack a secondary objective; the other two failed to hit the target and when attacked by GAF interceptors were unable to return their fire.lg5Regular missions began with participation in a great day- light attack on naval ships at Brest on 24 July; ’’’ in general, they were as unsuccessful as had been the maiden attempt. By 12 Septem- ber, twenty-two raids totaling thirty-nine sorties had been dispatched; eighteen planes had aborted, two had bombed secondary targets, so that only half had reached primary objectives. T w o were shot down and two so badly damaged that they crashed in landing; total combat 600
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