The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
in Hawaii, where the only likely bombardment targets were enemy
ships.ls5 In keeping with regular procurement policies which sought
to secure alternate sources of supply, the Air Corps let contracts with
the Sperry Gyroscope Company in 1933 for other improved models,
the C-3X and C-4.ls6
With the successful tests of the B-17 in 1935, the Air Corps had the
materiel prerequisites for precision bombardment: a long-range plane
of unusual stamina capable of flying above the effective range of flak,
and bombsights of unrivaled accuracy. The relatively small bomb
load of the plane enhanced the need for accuracy. During the next
few years, tactical procedures were refined, with special emphasis on
pattern bombing from tight formations. And as the GHQ Air Force
shifted its interest more and more toward counterair activities and
industrial objectives, tactics originated for strikes a t shipping were
adapted to land objectives. Scores achieved in training were impres-
sive. This accuracy was exaggerated in the legend of “pickle-barrel”
bombing which arose during that period, to the later discomfiture of
the AAF. But the results were clearly superior to those obtained by
European air forces during the first two years of war, a fact which
seems to have been accepted by the RAF. The moot point in AAF-
RAF debates was whether comparable accuracy could be maintained,
within acceptable attrition rates, under combat conditions in the
ETO.
The issue was squarely faced in AWPD/I. According to the de-
tailed analysis of the bomber campaign against Germany contained in
that plan, the AAF was to avoid to the extent possible diversionary
operations of the sort which were weakening Bomber Command’s
offensive, T h e full weight of American attacks should be concen-
trated against a limited number of designated targets: l S 7
Intermediate Objectives:
Primary Objectives:
3 0 aircraft and light-metals industries
5 0 electric power plants
47 transportation centers
2 7 petroleum and synthetic oil industries
-‘54
Some of the objectives listed were already under night attack by the
RAF, but to AWPD they appeared as precision targets to be de-
stroyed by approved AAF methods. Only when the industrial fabric
of Germany began to crack should the AAF turn to area bombing of
cities for morale purposes.188
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