The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
toward strategic bombardment was not strong enough to protect
Bomber Command from numerous diversions from its primary objec-
tives or from continued criticism. Just as the Eighth Air Force was
moving into combat, Sir Arthur Harris felt it necessary to draw up an
apologia for Bomber Command’s achievements16’ and to brand as
wanton propaganda” English efforts to belittle the results of its
b~mbing.’’~T o General Arnold he wrote: “We can defeat the enemy
if we are not defeated by our friends.”’64 The friends, one gathers,
were in the other services.
When the US.chiefs of staff accepted the strategy of ABC-I, it
was patent that in the event of an early involvement in war the
United States could not immediately deploy large ground forces in
Europe. This fact encouraged acceptance of a long prelude of
strategic bombardment, but even in 1941 American leaders showed a
more lively concern for the invasion of Europe than did the British.
When the British presented their review of strategy a t the Atlantic
conference, the Joint Board found it to give “an undue importance to
the probability of success solely through the employment of bombing
offensives.” 165 In this critique, the US.services presented a united
opinion which was not apparent in their internal considerations. In
the Joint Board Estimate of US.Over-all Production Requirements
of 11 September, each of the services supported its request for ma-
teriel with a statement on strategy; that of the AAF (AWPD/I) was
much closer to the British than was that of the Army or Navy. Ac-
ceptance of AWPD/I would have given to heavy bombers the same
sort of priorities they enjoyed in the British production program. T o
this the Navy was strongly opposed, and its campaign against accept-
ance of the implications of AWPD/I was staunchly buttressed by
references to British experience furnished by SPENAVO in London.
Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized the production priorities which made
that campaign possible; they showed, too, a corollary desire to revise
anticipated schedules for four-engine bombers in order to favor pro-
duction of U.S. and British carrier-based planes.las From the evidence
of a single isolated Bomber Command mission, Vice Adm. R.L.
Ghormley, SPENAVO’s chief, concluded that daylight bombing in
force was unsound except at very short range under heavy escort, and
that night bombing was ineffective and expensive.16‘
These attacks on policies fundamental to AAF and RAF alike
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