The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
I would like to have you see Eisenhower and get him to accept your
headquarters as his air planning unit. Get him to use you in that way
as he is the head of all US Army Forces in Europe. I want him to
recognize you as the top airman in all Europe.” 14‘ This request was
passed on to Eisenhower in a more formal communication, and on
2 1 August Spaatz was given additional duties as Air Officer for
ETOUSA and head of the air section of its The actual repre-
sentation a t ETOUSA headquarters was to be through a deputy and
assistants, but this measure assured to the Eighth Air Force an active
participation in theater planning as earlier arrangements had for plan-
ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor of his organizational scheme for the
USAFBI air force, General Arnold in February 1942 reminded Gen-
eral Chaney that U.S. bombardment operations must be guided by
American doctrines and principles, which were “entirely different”
from those of the British.”” In July, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris
wrote to General Eaker: “I myself, and all the members of my com-
mand who have been in official or unofficial relations with you and
yours, by now well appreciate that common doctrines prevail.” 1 5 0
During the five intervening months, neither air force had changed its
ideas materially, though by the latter date there was more mutual
understanding. The apparent contradiction in the two messages may
be explained only by the fact that Harris referred to a general con-
cept of air warfare, Arnold to the tactics by which that concept could
be realized. That pattern-of agreement as to ends, dissent as to
means-was so important a factor in the early operations of the Eighth
Air Force that some explanation should be given here of the rival
doctrines. Such an analysis will indicate that essentially Harris was
right: that the area of agreement far outweighed in importance the
doctrinal variations. Indeed, in respect to the role of air power in the
war, opinions tended often to follow service rather than national lines
of cleavage.
That fact should not be clouded by the apparent unanimity of
opinion in the earliest Anglo-American war plans. The prominence
given to strategic bombardment in ABC-I reflected the current weak-
ness of British and American forces. In March 1941 it was realized
that Germany would long remain too strong to be attacked frontally;
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