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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N I would like to have you see Eisenhower and get him to accept your headquarters as his air planning unit. Get him to use you in that way as he is the head of all US Army Forces in Europe. I want him to recognize you as the top airman in all Europe.” 14‘ This request was passed on to Eisenhower in a more formal communication, and on 2 1 August Spaatz was given additional duties as Air Officer for ETOUSA and head of the air section of its The actual repre- sentation a t ETOUSA headquarters was to be through a deputy and assistants, but this measure assured to the Eighth Air Force an active participation in theater planning as earlier arrangements had for plan- ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor of his organizational scheme for the USAFBI air force, General Arnold in February 1942 reminded Gen- eral Chaney that U.S. bombardment operations must be guided by American doctrines and principles, which were “entirely different” from those of the British.”” In July, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris wrote to General Eaker: “I myself, and all the members of my com- mand who have been in official or unofficial relations with you and yours, by now well appreciate that common doctrines prevail.” 1 5 0 During the five intervening months, neither air force had changed its ideas materially, though by the latter date there was more mutual understanding. The apparent contradiction in the two messages may be explained only by the fact that Harris referred to a general con- cept of air warfare, Arnold to the tactics by which that concept could be realized. That pattern-of agreement as to ends, dissent as to means-was so important a factor in the early operations of the Eighth Air Force that some explanation should be given here of the rival doctrines. Such an analysis will indicate that essentially Harris was right: that the area of agreement far outweighed in importance the doctrinal variations. Indeed, in respect to the role of air power in the war, opinions tended often to follow service rather than national lines of cleavage. That fact should not be clouded by the apparent unanimity of opinion in the earliest Anglo-American war plans. The prominence given to strategic bombardment in ABC-I reflected the current weak- ness of British and American forces. In March 1941 it was realized that Germany would long remain too strong to be attacked frontally; 591
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