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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“R.G.”33 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 ters and staff, and provision was to be made for bomber, fighter, ground air support, and air service commands. The basic role of AAF fighter units was to be direct support of bomber operations, and those units would not “be integrated with British fighter units employed in the defense of the United Kingdom, or into the British Fighter Command.” The RAF might support U.S. bombardment missions, either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic control of AAF operations, vested in the British government, should be construed to mean general strategic directives as to purpose and broad objectives,” but it was not to include “designation of targets or tactical control of operations.’’ For the air forces in the ETO, the broad objective was to gain “air supremacy over Western Continental Europe in preparation for and in support of a combined land, sea, and air movement across the Channel into Continental Europe.’’ For the better accomplishment of this mission, General Spaatz should be given authority for direct communications and “judicial shortcuts” in dealing with the RAF, Fleet Air Arm, and Combined Operations Command. This directive, as is apparent from its contents, was conceived under the influence of the SLEDGEHAMMER/ROUNDUP plans. TORCH was to divert to the Twelfth Air Force many of the units earmarked for the Eighth, and was to transfer to the former organiza- tion all responsibility for air-ground co-operation. Denuded of prom- ised strength, the Eighth was to revert to the strategy contemplated before April ~ g q - a n extended period of strategic bombardment in co-operation with the RAF. Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force than were those with American ground forces. No radical change in the command structure was required. In a directive to Spaatz issued on 2’1 July, Eisenhower recognized the parallel position of the Eighth and the Royal Air Force, authorizing direct commu- nication with the several commands of the latter and informal liaison with the Air Mini~try.“~In response, Spaatz submitted on 1 2 August a description of the internal organization of this force and of the actual machinery for co-ordination with the RAF in training and in operation^.^^' Meanwhile, an important step was taken to reinforce the position of the Eighth Air Force within the ETO organization. Arnold, anxious that the AAF be properly represented in planning at the theater level, wrote Spaatz on 3 0 July: “In connection with planning, & < 590
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.