“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ters and staff, and provision was to be made for bomber, fighter,
ground air support, and air service commands. The basic role of AAF
fighter units was to be direct support of bomber operations, and those
units would not “be integrated with British fighter units employed
in the defense of the United Kingdom, or into the British Fighter
Command.” The RAF might support U.S. bombardment missions,
either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic
control of AAF operations, vested in the British government, should
be construed to mean general strategic directives as to purpose and
broad objectives,” but it was not to include “designation of targets or
tactical control of operations.’’ For the air forces in the ETO, the
broad objective was to gain “air supremacy over Western Continental
Europe in preparation for and in support of a combined land, sea, and
air movement across the Channel into Continental Europe.’’ For the
better accomplishment of this mission, General Spaatz should be given
authority for direct communications and “judicial shortcuts” in dealing
with the RAF, Fleet Air Arm, and Combined Operations Command.
This directive, as is apparent from its contents, was conceived
under the influence of the SLEDGEHAMMER/ROUNDUP plans.
TORCH was to divert to the Twelfth Air Force many of the units
earmarked for the Eighth, and was to transfer to the former organiza-
tion all responsibility for air-ground co-operation. Denuded of prom-
ised strength, the Eighth was to revert to the strategy contemplated
before April ~ g q - a n extended period of strategic bombardment in
co-operation with the RAF. Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force than were those with American ground forces. No radical
change in the command structure was required. In a directive to
Spaatz issued on 2’1 July, Eisenhower recognized the parallel position
of the Eighth and the Royal Air Force, authorizing direct commu-
nication with the several commands of the latter and informal liaison
with the Air Mini~try.“~In response, Spaatz submitted on 1 2 August
a description of the internal organization of this force and of the
actual machinery for co-ordination with the RAF in training and in
operation^.^^'
Meanwhile, an important step was taken to reinforce the position
of the Eighth Air Force within the ETO organization. Arnold,
anxious that the AAF be properly represented in planning at the
theater level, wrote Spaatz on 3 0 July: “In connection with planning,
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