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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
CCS and the governments they represented, but initial planning was
carried on independently by several staffs. The views of the Eighth
Air Force were incorporated in a paper which Spaatz submitted to
Arnold, requesting that he recommend it to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Spaatz’ plan adapted to the European theater certain features
of the new War Department structure, others from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff organization. It placed the Army air component in the
United Kingdom on a level with that of the British (i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided for integral national forces each with its own
conventional chain of command, Spaatz proposed that in matters per-
taining exclusively to aviation, air commanders be allowed to settle
problems directly and “on the spot” with their British opposite
members.
Arnold approved this scheme in principle, and on the eve of his
departure for the London conference of 26 May, suggested that it be
co-ordinated with OPD * before it was sent up to the JCS.13s OPD
objected to a number of provisions, including the last named, and on
4 June submitted its own counterproposal^.^^^ Before these divergent
views came to the attention of the Joint Chiefs, the latter had received
from the British Chiefs of Staff Committee a memorandum on the
over-all command for the ROUNDUP/SLEDGEHAMMER opera-
tions, with several alternative suggestions for control arrangement^.'^^
The Joint Chiefs found no one of these satisfactory, and they felt that
the British had wrongly subordinated the main problem-combined
machinery for control of the theater-to that of command for what
was, after all, only a task force of unusual size. They felt also that
the as yet unnamed supreme commander should have some voice in
determining his own organi~ation.’~~So it was that final decision was
repeatedly postponed through June and July while the Combined
Chiefs debated the relative merits of ROUNDUP and TORCH.13g
The choice of T O R C H did result in the appointment of General
Eisenhower as Allied commander as well as theater commander, but
it was to be weeks before the air organization for T O R C H was per-
fected. That involved the creation of a new air force, the Twelfth,
and the story of its formation may be told more appropriately in
* On 23 March 1942, War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department General
Staff had been redesignated Operations Division (OPD).
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.