“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
P L A N S , P O L I C I E S , A N D O R G A N I Z A T I O N
including bombardment and pursuit aviation, in offensive operations.
Specifically, he was asked to review in light of the new strategy the
command structure outlined in his letter of 2 0 September and in his
radio messages of 3 0 January and 2 7 February, and to suggest any
modifications that seemed desirable.lZ6If this was not an order to
adopt Arnold’s suggestion, the implications were plain enough. A
week later, on the eve of his flight to the London BOLERO confer-
ence, Marshall cabled that Spaatz would organize and train an air
force in the States, and later direct its operations under USAFBI.”’
This was definite. Whatever detailed shape Chaney’s plan might take,
its general outlines had been determined. While Marshall was in Lon-
don, Arnold sent him, on 1 2 April, the air plan for BOLER0.12*
Already approved by WPD, this called for [he establishment in Eng-
land of the Eighth Air Force with its thre constituent commands.
air force organization to be established in Great Britain; but tacitly
on I May and unequivocally on the following day he indicated that
he had accepted Arnold’s plan in all important respects.1so Within a
few days he had given practical demonstration of his concurrence by
making arrangements for the actual siting of the headquarters of the
Eighth Air Force and the VITI Bomber, Fighter, and Service
Commands.’s1
Thus when Spaatz assumed command of the Eighth Air Force at
Bolling Field on 5 May,132the air organization for USAFBI had been
determined along general rather than specific lines. H e was anxious to
clarify his responsibilities under the BOLERO plan, but was to find
that no easy task. The commitment to BOLERO had perhaps tipped
the scales in favor of Arnold’s plan, but in some respects it had com-
plicated the organizational problem. For one thing, the “balanced” air
force contemplated for the invasion seemed to require a more elab-
orate internal structure: already the VIII Ground Air Support Com-
mand had been activated, on 2 8 April,1ss and other commands were
to be added soon.* The invasion would call for much closer co-opera-
tion with surface forces than had the original concept of a bomber
offensive, and in delineating the exact relations which the Eighth
would have toward other U.S. forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the theater and that to be
set up later for the invasion force, Ultimate decisions lay with the
Chaney held up his own arrangements “pen!iing clarification” of the
* See below, p. 616.
587