“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
to Marshall and Arnold, Chaney said flatly that he did not desire to
change views expressed in his previous messages since consideration
had been given to all points of the proposed organization.ll’
Blocked by this impasse in London, Arnold turned to higher au-
thority. On 2 6 February he had written the Chief of Staff asking that
Chaney be directed to organize USAFBI with correlative air, ground,
and service force commanders responsible directly to the theater com-
mander.lZ0 This memo was reviewed by W P D and, on 4 March,
General Eisenhower, chief of that office, expressed his disapproval.
The General Staff was then busy with its plans for a second front,
and W P D was unwilling to risk the loss of British co-operation
through an effort to impose on their existing organization a “US
system of totally different type.” Elence Arnold was informed that
“General Chaney’s telegram of January 30, on this subject, must be
accepted, for the present, as conclusive.” lZ1 There was, however,
this saving clause: the present decision would not preclude a later
revision of Chaney’s directive. Arnold could only point out the
obvious fact that his organization, far from being “totally different,”
was remarkably similar to that of the British,”’ and bide his time.
So on 5 March he could not write “much of an official nature’’ to
Eaker since affairs were “in too unsettled a state”; but he could sug-
gest quietly that Eaker go on with his organizational planning on the
assumption that things “will iron themselves out so that we will be
entirely satisfied.’’ lZ3
During March, while the War Department’s invasion plans were
shaping up, no change was made in Chaney’s directive, but RAIN-
BOW No. 5, which had been the basis of his plans, was rapidly
crumbling away. On 19 March, Marshall wrote Chaney that he should
provide for the reception of air and ground forces on a scale far
beyond that previously scheduled. The “token force” had been
scratched,lZ4and within a week the Navy had abandoned its design
for a base in Scotland, thus relieving USAFBI of the responsibility
for air defense there.lZ5The low priority given to air units for MAG-
NET similarly modified plans for Northern Ireland.” In the face of
these changes, Chaney’s scheme to build his organization around ter-
ritorial task forces had become obsolete.
O n 3 0 March, Marshall informed Chaney that his command ar-
rangements should be suitable for the employment of large forces,
* See above, p. 240.
586