The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
to Marshall and Arnold, Chaney said flatly that he did not desire to
change views expressed in his previous messages since consideration
had been given to all points of the proposed organization.ll’
Blocked by this impasse in London, Arnold turned to higher au-
thority. On 2 6 February he had written the Chief of Staff asking that
Chaney be directed to organize USAFBI with correlative air, ground,
and service force commanders responsible directly to the theater com-
mander.lZ0 This memo was reviewed by W P D and, on 4 March,
General Eisenhower, chief of that office, expressed his disapproval.
The General Staff was then busy with its plans for a second front,
and W P D was unwilling to risk the loss of British co-operation
through an effort to impose on their existing organization a “US
system of totally different type.” Elence Arnold was informed that
“General Chaney’s telegram of January 30, on this subject, must be
accepted, for the present, as conclusive.” lZ1 There was, however,
this saving clause: the present decision would not preclude a later
revision of Chaney’s directive. Arnold could only point out the
obvious fact that his organization, far from being “totally different,”
was remarkably similar to that of the British,”’ and bide his time.
So on 5 March he could not write “much of an official nature’’ to
Eaker since affairs were “in too unsettled a state”; but he could sug-
gest quietly that Eaker go on with his organizational planning on the
assumption that things “will iron themselves out so that we will be
entirely satisfied.’’ lZ3
During March, while the War Department’s invasion plans were
shaping up, no change was made in Chaney’s directive, but RAIN-
BOW No. 5, which had been the basis of his plans, was rapidly
crumbling away. On 19 March, Marshall wrote Chaney that he should
provide for the reception of air and ground forces on a scale far
beyond that previously scheduled. The “token force” had been
scratched,lZ4and within a week the Navy had abandoned its design
for a base in Scotland, thus relieving USAFBI of the responsibility
for air defense there.lZ5The low priority given to air units for MAG-
NET similarly modified plans for Northern Ireland.” In the face of
these changes, Chaney’s scheme to build his organization around ter-
ritorial task forces had become obsolete.
O n 3 0 March, Marshall informed Chaney that his command ar-
rangements should be suitable for the employment of large forces,
* See above, p. 240.
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