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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 the region around Huntingdon, which he had chosen in consultation with the British. As to the proposed air force structure, he thought that it might be suitable for a “virgin American theater” (i.e., the Caribbean) but “most undesirable” for the United Kingdom, and on the 30th definitely rejected it.lo5 T o reinforce his position, he re- quested GHQ to approve his own views for planning purposes, and on 3 February GHQ concurred.lo6 Hence the plan accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 1 6 February for establishing the initial AAF contingent in England provided only for a bomber command subject to Chancy’s control through such channels as he should desig- nate; there was no mention of an air force headquarters or of other air commands.107 In spite of this rebuff, Arnold was proceeding within the AAF on the assumption that his scheme would be adopted. On 31 January Brig. Gen. Ira C. Ealter had been designated bomber commander for USAFBI,’” and Arnold on 6 February cabled Chaney that he was holding up action until Eaker had presented the AAF’s views in Lon- Eaker’s orders stipulated that he should help prepare for the reception of his own command and of the air force which was to be “an intermediate headquarters between Bomber Command and the Theater Commander.” His own informal notes suggest also that his verbal instructions called for similar preparations for an air base and an interceptor command.’” T o reinforce the case for the last-named organization, Arnold opened on a new tack while Eaker was en route. Throughout, Chaney had argued against such a headquarters from the purely defensive role assigned to interceptor units in RAINBOW No. 5. Now, however, the Joint Chiefs were inclined to accept Arnold’s suggestion that pursuit units be included as a part of the striking force,”’ and the latter was quick to take advantage of that change. O n I Z February he listed for Chaney the combat units to be made available in 1 9 4 2 . ~ ”These included three pursuit groups to be used in conjunction with bomber operations and not for defense of England: Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate reply was a request that he be allowed to settle in London all details concerning USAFBI air forces and their tactical use.’ l 3 The issues involved were not “details”; what Chaney in London seemed not to realize was that the AAF’s struggle for control of its force in USAFBI merely paralleled the 5 84
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