“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the region around Huntingdon, which he had chosen in consultation
with the British. As to the proposed air force structure, he thought
that it might be suitable for a “virgin American theater” (i.e., the
Caribbean) but “most undesirable” for the United Kingdom, and on
the 30th definitely rejected it.lo5 T o reinforce his position, he re-
quested GHQ to approve his own views for planning purposes, and
on 3 February GHQ concurred.lo6 Hence the plan accepted by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff on 1 6 February for establishing the initial
AAF contingent in England provided only for a bomber command
subject to Chancy’s control through such channels as he should desig-
nate; there was no mention of an air force headquarters or of other
air commands.107
In spite of this rebuff, Arnold was proceeding within the AAF on
the assumption that his scheme would be adopted. On 31 January
Brig. Gen. Ira C. Ealter had been designated bomber commander for
USAFBI,’” and Arnold on 6 February cabled Chaney that he was
holding up action until Eaker had presented the AAF’s views in Lon-
Eaker’s orders stipulated that he should help prepare for the
reception of his own command and of the air force which was to be
“an intermediate headquarters between Bomber Command and the
Theater Commander.” His own informal notes suggest also that his
verbal instructions called for similar preparations for an air base and
an interceptor command.’” T o reinforce the case for the last-named
organization, Arnold opened on a new tack while Eaker was en route.
Throughout, Chaney had argued against such a headquarters from
the purely defensive role assigned to interceptor units in RAINBOW
No. 5. Now, however, the Joint Chiefs were inclined to accept
Arnold’s suggestion that pursuit units be included as a part of the
striking force,”’ and the latter was quick to take advantage of that
change. O n I Z February he listed for Chaney the combat units to be
made available in 1 9 4 2 . ~ ”These included three pursuit groups to be
used in conjunction with bomber operations and not for defense
of England: Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate reply was a request that
he be allowed to settle in London all details concerning USAFBI air
forces and their tactical use.’ l 3 The issues involved were not “details”;
what Chaney in London seemed not to realize was that the AAF’s
struggle for control of its force in USAFBI merely paralleled the
5 84